Politično pogojevanje pristopa k Evropski uniji v pokonfliktnih državah: primerjava Republike Ciper in držav Zahodnega Balkana by Gavran, Sara
 
 
UNIVERZA V LJUBLJANI 






Politično pogojevanje pristopa k Evropski uniji v pokonfliktnih 
državah: primerjava Republike Ciper in držav Zahodnega Balkana 
 
European Union Accession Political Conditionality in the Post-
Conflict States:  
A Comparison of the Republic of Cyprus and the Western Balkan 
States   
 
 










UNIVERZA V LJUBLJANI 





Mentor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ana Bojinović Fenko  
 
Politično pogojevanje pristopa k Evropski uniji v pokonfliktnih 
državah: primerjava Republike Ciper in držav Zahodnega Balkana 
 
European Union Accession Political Conditionality in the Post-
Conflict States:  
A Comparison of the Republic of Cyprus and the Western Balkan 
States   
 
 





















To my parents, thank you for unconditional love, understanding, and above all support. Please 
stay safe!  
To my sister and for the times she missed me a lot, and when I missed her a lot. 
To my grandmothers and grandfather for sending all support, and all those concerns. I will be 
fine, and I am neither cold nor hungry.  
To my family.  
To my (girl)friends all over the word…thank you for the long and “everything will be ok” talks.  
This would not be possible without you. Thank you all, thank you M.!  
Above all, special thanks to my thesis mentor, Assoc. Prof. Dr Ana Bojinović Fenko, for enormous 
patience, support, inspiration, understanding, help, guidance, time devotion, and quick responses to my 
late-night e-mails.   
  
 
European Union Accession Political Conditionality in the Post-Conflict States: A 
Comparison of the Republic of Cyprus and the Western Balkan States 
Abstract: This master’s thesis focuses on the accession process of Cyprus, Croatia, and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (BiH) to the European Union (EU) to determine how the EU’s formulation of 
enlargement policy, particularly the use of political conditionality, differed from the general 
approach towards non-post-conflict states. The first aim was to investigate how these states were 
addressed as post-conflict states to verify the predominance of either stabilization or integration 
goals in the EU’s political conditionality. The second aim was to determine which enlargement 
policy instruments the EU used in the accession negotiations to overcome the requested 
conditionality. The results show that the EU changed its political conditionality to post-conflict 
states as it defined Croatia and BiH as post-conflict states and prioritized stability over integration 
goals, which was not the case for Cyprus. The EU also introduced new instruments adapted to 
Croatian and BiH post-conflict situation: i.e., multilateral post-conflict reconciliation and 
cooperation for regional stability, but their effect highly differs. 
Keywords : European Union, enlargement policy, post-conflict states, Cyprus, Croatia, BiH.  
 
Politično pogojevanje pristopa k Evropski uniji v pokonfliktnih državah: primerjava 
Republike Ciper in držav Zahodnega Balkana 
Povzetek: Magistrska naloga se osredotoča na pristopna pogajanja v Evropsko unijo (EU) s 
Ciprom, Hrvaško ter z Bosno in Hercegovino z namenom ugotavljanja razlik v pristopu k širitveni 
politiki EU do teh pokonfliktnih držav, predvsem na področju uporabe političnega pogojevanja. 
Prvi cilj je ugotoviti, na kakšen način so bile države prosilke določene kot pokonfliktne države, z 
namenom potrjevanja prevlade stabilizacijskih ali integracijskih ciljev v političnem pogojevanju 
EU. Drugi cilj je določiti, katere predpristopne instrumente je EU uporabljala v pogajanjih, da bi 
države izpolnile zahtevane pogoje. Raziskava pokaže, da je EU spremenila politične pogoje do 
pokonfliktnih držav, kot sta Hrvaška in Bosna in Hercegovina, saj je njunem primeru dala prednost 
ciljem stabilnosti pred integracijo, kar za Ciper ni veljalo. EU je prav tako vpeljala nove 
instrumente, ki so prilagojeni hrvaškim in bosanskim pokonfliktnim razmeram, kot na primer 
večstransko pokonfliktno spravo ter sodelovanje za regijsko stabilnost, vendar se njihov učinek v 
teh državah močno razlikuje. 
Ključne besede:  Evropska unija, širitvena politika, pokonfliktne države, Ciper, Hrvaška, Bosna 
in Hercegovina.
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1 Introduction   
 
1.1 Relevance and Goals of the Master’s Thesis 
Even if the European Union (EU, also the Union) was struck with many internal as well external 
crises in recent years, it is still improving its relations with the Western Balkans (WB) mapping 
the way forward in the latter’s process of the EU integration, particularly with the Western Balkans 
Summit in Sofia (held on 17th May 2018) (European Commission, 2018). The EU integration can 
be regarded as a peace project (Birchfield, Krige and Young, 2017) and if evaluated from the 
perspective of the Second World War European post-conflict societies and peaceful integration of 
Central and Eastern Europe into the EU after the Cold War, a very successful one. The EU was 
even rewarded with the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize as it managed, with free trade, democracy, and 
enlargement procedures, to build stability and security in the practically entire European continent. 
However, the remaining post-conflict states of WB are still non-members of the EU. Thus, it is 
important to observe post-conflict states on their path to EU membership as the predominant group 
of states that are currently candidates or applicants for EU membership represents post-conflict 
states from the WB region. The current situation in the WB is characterized by the absence of 
violence, which does not mean the absence of conflict.  
Two decades ago, the future of the WB was seen within the EU (Fouere, 2017), yet nowadays the 
EU is losing ground (ibid.). The region of the WB is a post-conflict region in transition with the 
perspective of joining the EU; it is still affected by economic strife, ethnic tensions, and a high 
level of distrust in political leadership (Stanković, 2017, p. 24). Countries of the region are not the 
only ones to blame for their failures, the EU also bears some responsibility. Since 2011, the rule 
of the law was placed at the heart of the EU’s accession process. Unfortunately, the EU did not 
have effective monitoring and implementation mechanisms and pursued a “general enlargement 
policy” approach, which failed to grasp the core of the problem (Marciacq, 2017, p. 6). The general 
enlargement policy approach was out of touch with reality and did not nudge the WB leaders to 
make optional choices genuinely supportive of their country’s EU agenda (ibid.). Thus, this thesis 
will research the formulation of EU foreign policy, which is primarily conducted through the 
enlargement policy, toward the selected states with specific attention to their post-conflict 
situations. 
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Another focus of this thesis is also to discover whether and what lessons the EU, particularly the 
European Commission (EC), has learned from the enlargement process of post-conflict states. 
Thus, the first aim of this thesis is to analyse how the EU formulates policy goals concerning post-
conflict states within its enlargement policy. Such an analysis can provide evidence that the EU 
can no longer use a general enlargement policy (“business as usual”) approach and can further 
illustrate how separate enlargement strategies were and/or need to be prepared. I am especially 
interested in analysing how the EU uses the concept of conditionality, a powerful tool that can 
influence a positive change and introduce a productive approach to post-conflict scenarios 
(Elbasani, 2013, p. 19). Different policies have different types of conditionality that have a 
different instrument of policy implementation. In this regard, this thesis is interested in observing 
only the political criteria and political conditionality in the EU accession processes as they are 
most directly relevant for post-conflict societies.  
This thesis will use a comparison of three case studies of post-conflict states in the EU accession 
process, namely the Republic of Cyprus; and two states from the WB – Croatia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The longstanding Cyprus problem emerged in the year 1974 as a response to the 
Turkish intervention in the Greek coup on the island. Since then, Cyprus is divided in two, with 
Greek-Cypriots living in the southern part under the legally recognized Republic of Cyprus (RoC) 
and Turkish-Cypriots living in the northern part under the unrecognized, self-declared, 
administration called the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC) (Dagli, 2017). 
Moreover, after the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia, the EU created the Stabilization and 
Association Process (SAP) as the new basis for relations among the countries of the WB.1 Yet, the 
prospect for obtaining membership is less certain than was assumed when the SAP was launched 
(Phinnemore, 2013, p. 23). Among the WB states, this thesis will explore the case of the Republic 
of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Only the Republic of Croatia managed to become 
the first WB state member of the EU as the last to have joined the EU. In the example of other 
countries, it is not clear who is struggling more – the EU or the potential member state, particularly 
in the case of complex BiH which is an applicant state as of 14 February 2016 (European 
 
1 Countries of the Western Balkans are: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro at that time of the creation of SAP in June 1999), and the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (Northern Macedonia). 
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Commission, 2017). To reach this aim, I will draw on extensive examination and inquiry of key 
EU documents, existing scholarship, initial assent, EU progress reports, and policy briefs. 
By reflecting the way BiH responded and adopted to EU’s pressure, the EU can “rethink” its 
concept of enlargements and its criteria of evaluation, which could not simply be a replica of the 
pattern successfully implemented in Central Europe (this is how the SAP framework was created) 
(Barbulescu and Troncota, 2013, p. 93). The replica of the pattern learned the political elites in the 
Balkans to plat the EU by adopting its language – the language of reform, the rule of law, and civil 
society involvements - while consolidating their power through ever-tightening controls over civic 
space, the media, political parties and other institutions (Vogel, 2018). The EU is aware of this 
state of affairs. The problem is policy drift and inertia as bureaucracies are vested in the 
continuation of the current approach. This is visible in the EU’s reporting. The EC’s annual reports 
on the candidate and potential candidate countries focus narrowly on deliverables across the 35 
policy chapters into which accession negotiations are divided and hence fail to provide a clear 
account, let alone analysis, of broader trend lines, creating an overly positive image of the situation 
in a given country. The highly diplomatic language of the reports makes them unsuitable as a tool 
for civil society or the media to monitor the reform record of their governments, or as an advocacy 
instrument for the EU (BiEPAG, 2017). While each country has its specificities, the decline has 
affected not just BiH and Kosovo, which are the furthest from accession, but also Serbia and 
Montenegro, the EU accession frontrunners. Even Croatia has experienced similar setbacks. This 
casts doubt on the widely accepted assumption that the EU’s influence is higher the closer a 
candidate country gets to accession, and that ‘a credible accession perspective is the key driver of 
transformation in the region’ (European Commission, 2018).  
The second aim of this thesis is to determine what lessons have been learned through the EU’s use 
of conditionality in post-conflict states and whether policy goals have been altered according to 
policy results. Exploring the case of a divided Cyprus, the latest EU member Croatia, and a 
potential member BiH, will give me important insights into the timing of EU’s different 
enlargement strategy formulation in post-conflict states and the potential variability of 
conditionality altered due to learned lessons from previous acceding states. Bojinović Fenko and 
Urlić (2015) showed by comparing the accession of Slovenia and Croatia that conditionality was 
used more meticulously in the application of Croatia compared to Slovenia. The authors conclude 
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there were differences in the accession period of the 2004 round and the WB, especially in terms 
of additional political conditionality referring to post-conflict WB regional criteria of accession. 
In the case of divided Cyprus, the Copenhagen criteria used the principle of conditionality as a tool 
for a domestic adjustment (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005) and introduced conflict 
resolution in exchange for the benefits of an EU membership (Tocci, 2007). In the WB states, there 
were conditions labelled as the Copenhagen-plus criteria (De Vasconcelos, 2009, p. 7) and 
incorporated regional cooperation and full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). With that in mind, this research will focus on whether Cyprus, 
Croatia, and BiH have been identified in the EU’s enlargement policy as post-conflict states, and 
how political conditionality differed for post-conflict states in comparison to others, namely 
transferring the experience from Cyprus’ accession process to that of the two WB states. 
1.2 Research Question  
Meeting the criteria of Article 49 of the Treaty on EU (TEU) represents the legal basis for any 
European state to join the EU (Juncos and Borragan, 2013, p. 227). That includes respecting the 
values laid out in Article 2 TEU, committed to promoting and applying them to become a member 
of the Union (ibid.). The values of Article 2 TEU are as follows (ibid., p. 230): “Respect for 
human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, 
including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member 
States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity, and 
equality between women and men prevail”. According to Article 49 TEU, every state, on its path 
to EU membership needs to fulfil conditions that are formulated in the Copenhagen and Madrid 
European Councils, the most important one being the political criteria (European Council, 2017). 
Political criteria are composed of stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities (Bojinović Fenko and Urlić, 2015, p. 
109). The political criteria consist of elements of the political system, such as related to 
democracy and the rule of law that are very difficult to measure objectively (Beurdeley, 2003). 
The main problem behind it is the nonexistence in the EU’s primary legislation, as some 
conditions have been formulated recently and some are changing due to new phenomena in the 
international environment (Bojinović Fenko and Urlić, 2015, p. 110). This gives the possibility 
to the EU in setting, interpreting, and measuring political criteria and use political conditionality 
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following the EU’s interpretation of the compliance with political accession criteria. In the EU’s 
interpretation of political criteria, the EU (the EC or the Member States) can demand additional 
political conditions, as constitutional reform for BiH, Kosovo-Serbia normalization of relations 
agreement, or resolving the use of the Macedonian name (into Northern Macedonia). All such 
additional political conditions, which the EU has the right to set, confirm that political 
conditionality demands adequate fulfilment by the applicant state (ibid.).  
When observing the opinions of the institutions and the declarations of the EC, European Council 
(Council), and the European Parliament as well as the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Justice, the importance of democracy was underlined on numerous occasions (Kochenov, 2004, 
p. 10). The focus was on the elections, the functioning of the legislature, and the functioning of 
the executive, the functioning of the judiciary, and the anti-corruption measures (Kochenov, 
2004, p. 13). Upon the experience of the 2004 enlargement round, the rule of law was underlined 
even more. According to Kochenov (ibid.), the rule of law in the TEU refers to different national 
concepts and requires the national reform that is demanded from a candidate country in their EU 
path. Noutcheva (2012, p. 45) would argue that the weak or potentially failing states are not to 
be accepted into the EU because in 2012–2013 EU enlargement strategy, the EC itself 
emphasized that the rule of law and democratic governance are central to the enlargement process 
(European Commission, 2012, p. 4). The attention to human rights and minority protection was 
more emphasized during the Big Bang enlargement to prevent social exclusion and 
discrimination in post-communist societies; but the focus on minorities was even more 
accentuated in the case of Croatia – the topic of minorities was mentioned 356 times, meaning 
more than 300 % of the frequency compared to the case of Big Bang acceding the state of 
Slovenia (Bojinović Fenko and Urlić, 2015, p. 117).   
Additional “innovation” of the Big Bang enlargement was the carrot and stick method, meaning 
that a reward is a significant step toward accession after complying with the EU’s political 
conditions, or otherwise, if there is no complying with the EU’s political conditions, the target 
country would be excluded from the EU membership (Schimmelfennig, 2008, p. 920). It is a 
pattern of conditionality that represents “negative conditionality”, which is applied when the 
candidate state fails to meet the criteria – they are consequently denied assistance, association, or 
membership, and are left behind in the competition (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005, p. 
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5). If a candidate country wants to move forward in the accession process, it needs to meet the 
criteria of the EU. The concept of conditionality stands as a powerful tool by which the EU can 
greatly influence a country in the accession process, but its application differs from state to state. 
This indicates that the EU can have an individual approach to all potential members, and a 
different approach to the post-conflict institutional-building processes (Juncos and Borragan, 
2013, p. 229). 
Despite that, the principle of conditionality has in general not been used consistently as part of 
the EU foreign policy strategy. Set in 1993, the Copenhagen criteria required that the candidate 
country needs to achieve the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and respects for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market 
economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the 
EU (European Parliament, 1993). In 2006, the Council placed a stronger emphasis on general 
political conditions, while in 2011, the priority was to address the rule of law and put a stronger 
focus on tackling organized crime and corruption (European Parliament briefing, 2016, p. 2). The 
changing of the EU’s enlargement strategy was the response employed during the enlargement 
rounds in 2004, 2007, and 2013. In other words, the EU changed the concept of conditionality as 
the enlargement policy evolved. The enlargement rounds in 2004, 2007, and 2013 set the standard 
for accession higher for countries that are applying for the membership and that presents a more 
complex case in comparison to previous candidates (EU Parliament briefing, 2016, p. 2). In those 
instances, EC’s post-2004 application was characterized by the principle of “differentiation”, 
which means that each applicant country progresses at its own pace according to its level of 
preparedness for accession (Bojinović Fenko and Urlić, 2015, p. 114), called the “principle of 
own merits” (European Commission, 2012, p. 3) and from the interpretation of Article 49 of the 
TEU (Bojinović Fenko and Urlić, 2015, p. 113). This does not ease the EU membership path to 
the states that are recovering from conflict. Thus, the political conditionality today includes: fight 
against corruption, social and cultural rights, and good neighbourly relations among states 
(Dobrikovic, 2012, p.35). 
As political criteria consist of already mentioned values of Article 2 TEU (democracy, equality, 
the rule of law, and judiciary system) it is important to focus on how they are met in post-conflict 
states and situations and were there some special conditions. In this study, I focus on the negative 
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actions applied to the two countries, using the notion “negative conditionality” as a pattern of 
conditionality application when candidate countries fail to meet the criteria (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier, 2005, p. 5).  
Nevertheless, the post-conflict states are not easy to define. This led Brown, Lander and Stewart 
(2011, p. 5) to conclude that post-conflict states should be observed in a transition continuum 
rather than to place them in boxes of being hostile or living in peace. The authors suggest the 
following peace milestones (Brown, Lander and Stewart, 2011, p. 5): cessation of hostilities and 
violence; signing of political-peace agreements; demobilization, disarmament and reintegration; 
refugee reparation; establishing a functional state; achieving reconciliation and societal 
integration; economic recovery. On their path to peace, it is also possible for post-conflict states 
to move backward, a direction which also has its own peace milestones. That being said, this 
thesis will observe the functional states wherein a peace milestone is established.  
The research question will explore the lessons the EU learned from the political conditionality of 
Cyprus in comparison to those acquired during the conditionality application to Croatia, as well 
as how these lessons are being applied in the case of BiH’s path to EU membership. Therefore, 
the research question is: How does the EU’s application of political conditionality to post-conflict 
states in the accession process of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s accession differ from that of Cyprus 
and Croatia? 
1.3 The Theoretical and Methodological Framework  
In this chapter, starting from a constructivist approach in International Relations, the EU as a global 
actor in international politics will be examined. Even if state-centric approaches have prevailed in 
International Relations literature and the traditional foreign policy worldview, the consideration of 
the EU as an actor in global politics cannot be neglected as it has been evolving since 1970. One 
of the prevailing EU-as-actor views were by Duchene’s CPE (‘a civilian power Europe’), Ginsberg 
decision-making structures (as EU as a niche international security provider that strengthened EU 
foreign policy), and Sjöstedt “cohesion” and “autonomy” (as to agree on common 
positions/policies and formulating common policy goals) (Požgan, 2017, p. 15).  
The EU is a unique actor and conceptualizing its role in the international community has presented 
a challenge, which is well addressed via a constructivist lens. Constructivists claim interstate 
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interactions are socially constructed, as social structures are not given, but rather constructed 
through social practices (Wendt, 1992, p. 406). This approach does not disregard the importance 
of identities, interests, and perceptions of actors involved in international politics (Wendt, 1992, 
p. 409). In that sense, the EU will be observed and described as a global actor via the concept of 
actorness (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006) with a focus on explaining the EU’s foreign policy. As 
an actor, the EU has the opportunity and willingness to act. As Hollis and Smith (1989, p. 42) put 
it: “Whatever the unit, its activities can be explained from without or understood from within. 
Every unit has a decision-making process. Those making the decisions are influenced from outside 
and from inside” (Kinsella, Russett and Starr, 2013, p. 18).  
When presented with an opportunity, a decision maker’s willingness to choose a course of action 
reflects its goals and motivations (ibid.). Particularly, the willingness is in our focus, as it may shed 
light on why one course of action was chosen over another (Kinsella, Russett and Starr, 2013, p. 
19). Hence, the independent variable is the willingness of the EU, which under the “menu” of 
choice and constraints it has on the disposal, will answer the question of how decision-makers 
define post-conflict states as such. To operationalize the independent variable of willingness, the 
EU’s capability aspect of actorness will be measured in the cases of post-conflict states. Capability 
is central because it is connected to the ability to formulate effective policies, meaning to not use 
“general enlargement policies”, but to develop those related to post-conflict situations in applicant 
states; with the purpose to challenge the appropriateness of policy instruments. As I am researching 
how the EU formulates policy goals concerning post-conflict states, the dependent variable, 
meaning EU capability (policy goals and instruments), will be examined. The Independent variable 
is EU willingness (course of action) which is reflected in the formulation of conditionality that 
varied to three post-conflict states. The EU’s capability is the internal context of the EU and its 
ability to formulate effective policies and the availability of appropriate policy instruments 
(Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, p. 28).  
Two aims of this thesis will be achieved with the method of comparative analysis of the selected 
case studies: Cyprus, Croatia, and BiH, in determining the application of EU conditionality 
concerning post-conflict states. I expect to confirm the following thesis: The EU changed the use 
of conditionality in the formulation of the political criteria for the post-conflict state of the 2004 
enlargement round with the Republic of Cyprus in comparison to the accession processes of the 
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WB states, namely, the Republic of Croatia and BiH. To support (or refute) the thesis, qualitative 
research with a comparative analysis will be used. Tackling mainly the question of what the EU 
did, particularly how the EC changed policy goals and instruments during the process, will 
facilitate a macro-analysis and historical overview. Analysing and interpreting primary sources, 
namely legislative and executive documents by the Council of the EU (legislative documents) and 
the Council (executive documents) as well as the interpretation of secondary sources will be used.  
The comparison between cases can help inform what has been achieved in the time of the 
respective state’s accession process and what dilemmas were addressed during these processes. 
Reading and examining the official EU documents as well the Council of Europe (CoE) reports, 
will explore the conditions that were written in the EC’s initial assessments of states’ preparedness 
to become EU member states. The focus will then be on the EC progress reports because the EC 
is the agenda setter and policy initiator as well as policy implementer, also by managing the budget. 
I duly notice that the Council decides and dominates policy-making (by informing the European 
Parliament) (Keukeleire and MacNaugh, 2016, p. 66). However, while the Council can make major 
decisions about the EU’s relations with other regions and countries, it depends on the EC for their 
implementation (Keukeleire and MacNaugh, 2016, p. 71). Additionally, relevant European 
Council Presidency Conclusions will be referred to, from the beginning of accession negotiation 
until the end of negotiations and signature of accession treaties of the three respective states.  
The case study comparison of three post-conflict states, Cyprus, Croatia, and BiH, will explore the 
EU capability (policy goals and instruments) that will enable measurement of effects of 
conditionality via policy evaluation, which are done in EC progress Reports. EC especially looks 
into the CoE reports on post-conflict management; thus, I will refer to those as well. CoE reports 
will be used, as BiH is still not a part of the EU, and I will explore the EC’s progress report, 
particularly that from the year 2016. I will search for definition markers that are related to post-
conflict states as conflict, dispute, reconciliation, Turkey, Greece, economy, and Annan Plan. This 
will also be done for Croatia and BiH with focusing on additional relevant elements of former 
Yugoslav dissolution conflicts, such as war, war-torn state, Yugoslavian dissolution, the Dayton 
Peace Agreement, SAP, and the ICTY. All the above-mentioned documents will be observed to 
determine whether all case states were identified and addressed as post-conflict states.  
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1.4 The Structure of the Thesis  
After the introduction, the second chapter will demonstrate the conceptual link between post-
conflict states and political criteria for the EU accession. In the empirical part, a comparative 
analysis of the application of political conditionality will follow in order to determine how the 
process of BiH differs from that of Cyprus and Croatia. Chapter 3 will provide a historical 
explanation of each case. It is important to explain the domestic, regional, and global actors that 
were involved in the particular case as they set an opportunity for the EU’s foreign policy action. 
Here, the aim is to research the involvement of the EU, how the relationship with the EU and a 
particular case state emerged, and how the negotiations for the accession started from the 
perspective of the EU values.  
Chapter 4 will define how the EU formulated enlargement policy goals and examine how political 
conditionality differs for post-conflict states. The research will show whether the EC had the 
intention of formulating a different approach regarding the post-conflict states on their path to EU 
membership. The focus will be on analysing whether (and if so, how) the three case states had 
been defined as post-conflict in the EC initial assessment.  
Chapter 5 focuses on the enlargement policy instruments. The second aim of this thesis is to 
determine what lessons have been learned through the EU’s use of conditionality in post-conflict 
states, meaning to observe how the principle of conditionality differed from Big-Bang enlargement 
to WB enlargement. Again, by examining the EU's initial assessment I will search for the 
conditions to see if the EC applied the same type of instrument or it changed the latter according 
to lessons previously learned. Additionally, I will explore whether there existed differences in the 
outcome with the reference to post-conflict states. Through the CoE reports, the outcome of 
conditionality will be examined to see how it was effective. In the end, I will explore the social 
learning of the EC in the Council from Cyprus to Croatia, and finally to BiH. In this chapter, a 
comparison will be drawn between the conditionality for BiH to determine whether it was 
formulated based on experience with Cyprus and/or with Croatia.                     
In the Conclusion, I compare the difference in the formulation of EU enlargement policy toward 
selected post-conflict states. As the previous chapters are based on the exploration of separate 
cases, this section will compare all three cases to discover whether there were any differences and 
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whether learning took place on the part of the EU. In the Conclusion, I answer my research 
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2 The European Union as a Foreign Policy Subject 
 
For most experts, the term foreign policy consists of what one state does to other states, with the 
two most frequent choices – conflict or cooperation (even though some states can have passive 
foreign policy and be isolated). Upon that implication, scholars insert the question of sovereignty, 
which is creating division between what is domestic and foreign, home, and abroad. Therefore, 
foreign policy is defined as the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent 
actor (usually but not exclusively a state) in international relations (Hill, 2016, p. 4). The definition 
breaks the assumption of state behaviour based on the realist reference to a state’s power and 
national interest, as the independent actor can be the EU that works in official external relations 
that produce the possibility to include all parts of the governing mechanisms of the state (ibid.). 
Thus, according to Hill, foreign policy is the “sum” of official relations as the actors seek some 
degree of coherence toward the outside world, some strategies for coping with foreigners. Foreign 
policy exposes the question “who acts, for whom and with what effect?” (ibid.). Emphasizing the 
purposive and cohesive dimension answers the question of why the policy is “foreign”.  
The strategies to cope with foreigners are made by actors in world politics, which need to refer to 
political aspects as actions, statements, and values (Hill, 2016, p. 6). To observe the environment 
and behaviour of actors out there was enabled with the changed international context. There were 
four major changes: The end of the Cold War, the process of globalization, the attack by the Islamic 
fundamentalists on Western predominance, and the challenge to the Westphalian state system, 
represented by the doctrine of humanitarian intervention (Hill, 2016, p. 17) and its responsibility 
to protect. As the international community in the previous century witnessed a lot of conflicts, 
wars, civil wars, and terrorist attacks, the EU has deployed almost 30 EU military operations and 
civilian missions on three continents (Keukeleire and MacNaugh, 2016, p. 2) since 2003. Missions 
had peace-building efforts, which seem to be more important than the prevention of conflict. 
However, the EU saw the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 as a 
unique opportunity to unite the continent. With the transition to liberal democracy and market 
economy that welcomed ten post-communist countries, enlargement policy became the most 
successful foreign policy to date (Elbasani, 2013, p. 1). The most positive attempt to adapt to the 
changing geostrategic environment was the accession of ten Central and Eastern European 
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countries with Cyprus and Malta. It served as proof that the enlargement process was and is the 
foreign policy (Keukeleire and MacNaugh, 2016, p. 60), as it reshapes the political, legal, socio-
economic, and mental structures of applicant states (ibid.).      
Hence, EU foreign policy is the area of European policies that are directed at the external 
environment to influence that environment and the behavior of other actors within it, to pursue 
interests, values, and goals (Keukeleire and MacNaugh, 2016, p. 1). The EU foreign policy and its 
context are constantly changing, but somehow, it always deals with two facets. One is the 
management and solution of conflicts and another is the structuring of societies, states, and regions 
(Keukeleire and MacNaugh, 2016, p. 5).  
In 1999, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was introduced for the management 
and solution of conflict. The region of the WB was of central concern to European foreign policy 
due to large-scale violence of ethno-nationalist nature. According to Anastasakis, Caplan and 
Economides (2009) the official EU relations with post-conflict states represented a combination 
of development assistance for reconstruction and future development thereof and (re)structuring 
of societies, states, and regions. For that reason, the aim of this thesis will not be to address conflict 
management as an effort of preventing the escalation of the higher-degree conflict (Butler, 2009), 
but to explore EU policy toward countries that are struggling with the legacy of violence, primarily 
those that finds itself in a post-conflict stage of development (Brown, Langer and Stewart, 2011).  
Yet, the most positive attempt to adapt to the changing geostrategic environment was the accession 
of ten Central and Eastern European countries with Cyprus and Malta. It was proof that the 
enlargement process was and is the foreign policy (Keukeleire and MacNaugh, 2016, p. 60), as it 
reshapes the political, legal, socio-economic, and mental structures of applicant states (ibid.).  
 
2.1 The European Union’s Actorness via Enlargement Policy 
To explore the EU’s foreign policy towards post-conflict states, there needs to be a model that will 
explain the EU’s enlargement policy goal and the pressure capability the EU possesses for its 
implementation. The EU as Global Actor (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006) can provide a useful 
conceptual framework for the EU’s foreign policy. In state-centric theories of International 
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Relations, the focus is on the international political system, as other as transnational business 
corporations and intergovernmental organization is subordinate to those of states (Bretherton and 
Vogler, 2006, p. 14). However, several authors recently rejected the state-centric approach. One 
of them was Ginsberg (2001) who with his extensive research found the EU’s external political 
influence is substantial, leading to the conclusion that the EU as an “economic giant-political 
pygmy” is invalid (ibid., p. 11).  
 
Defining the EU as a global actor, Bretherton and Vogler (2006) use a social constructivist 
approach, emphasizing the processes of social interaction in which actors engage in global politics. 
The interactions, which can be formal and informal, shape the evolution of actors’ identities. 
However, the recognition of an actor is provided by Public International Law, so the focus is on 
the inter-state system, and the actors will be defined in terms of the notion of legal personality. 
What mostly defines the EU in legal terms and gives legal personality differencing from the epithet 
“economic giant”, firstly comes from the creation of the EU and the TEU in November 1993. 
Under TEU, the EU comprised three “Pillars”. Pillar I is the European Community with a 
community integration method. Pillar II is an intergovernmental cooperation method that 
facilitated foreign and security policy. Pillar III is concern with internal security and judiciary 
(Bretherton and Vogler 2006, p. 13). Three pillars (TEU) were amended in Lisbon 2007 with the 
Lisbon Treaty that secondly, stepping into the force in 2009, gave the entire EU a legal personality. 
The first and third pillar merged, meaning intergovernmental cooperation with their decision-
making mechanism (the “Community”) was abolished, as there is no need for distinction – there 
is just one organization, the Union (Piris, 2010, pp. 66–67). Three Pillars are those which give 
legal personality to the EU and the EU can conclude international agreements. 
  
Even if the EU has a legal personality, how is the EU recognized as an actor? Again, the answer 
is the same as the one given by lawyers: statehood. In case of the EU, the International Relations 
literature has not been successful in EU’s categorization as an actor. Moreover, it was categorized 
as an intergovernmental organization, which failed to capture the EU’s multi-dimensional 
character (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, p. 15). The attribution of actorness needs to abandon the 
explanation of the formal organization and to affiliate the behavioral approach. The behavioral 
definition of an actor would be an entity that is capable of formulating purposes and making 
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decisions and thus engaging in some form of purposive action (ibid.). In that sense, the actor needs 
to have autonomy (which in the EU are internal procedures and voting arrangements) and to 
perform continuing functions (‘to some degree for most of the time’) that have an impact on inter-
state relations (ibid.).  
 
Nonetheless, constructivists see any kind of structure as the one that can provide as well constrain. 
At the same time, actors have agency – that is they are rule-makers as well as rule takers (ibid., p. 
19). In constructivist analyses, structures are not defined in material terms (as neo-Realist would 
say), rather they are intersubjective (ibid., p. 19). Thus, concerning the international system: 
“Intersubjective systemic structures consist of shared understandings, expectation and social 
knowledge embedded in international institutions /…/ Intersubjective structures give meaning to 
material ones, and it is in terms of meanings that actors act” (Wendt, 1994, p. 389). The structure 
does not determine outcomes, but provides the opportunity and constraint within which the agency 
is displayed Bretherton and Vogler, 2006 p. 21). Actors are different in their availability of 
resources, although when and how to use those resources will be shaped by the interplay of various 
factors, which are not just economic and military instruments, but are also connected to knowledge 
and political will/skill. For example, for the EU, in their relation to the post-conflict states, political 
energy and creativity in responding to opportunities afforded by post-conflict structures will be 
important. To sum up, the EU contributes to the process of constructing international structures, 
both as a purposive actor exploiting opportunities presented, and through its unique presence 
(Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, p. 22). 
 
The EU acts based on the notion of presence, opportunity, and capability that combine in varying 
ways to shape the EU’s external activities (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, p. 22). Opportunity is 
related to the external environment, presence is the ability of the EU and internal priorities and 
policies, and capability is the availability of instruments and understandings about the EU’s ability 
to utilize those instruments in response to opportunity and/or to capitalize on the presence (ibid.). 
The EU as a part of an intersubjective international structure shapes its construction, while through 
its unique presence as a purposive actor it exploits the opportunities presented (ibid.). On the other 
hand, the EU’s capability – termed as tools and instruments to carry out the policies – is co-
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constructed in such social interaction as well. The EU’s conditionality towards post-conflict 
applicant states in the enlargement policy will be conceptualized within this approach. 
 
The notion of presence, opportunity, and capability also portraits the EU as an actor in international 
politics that give it the possibility to act. The EU’s presence refers to its ability to exert influence 
externally (ibid.), thus influencing states to act according to Article 2 TEU as well as to implement 
EU’s political conditionality. It is not purposive external action, but rather the attractiveness to 
become an EU member – particularly due to the economic influence of the Union – that gives the 
Union the possibility of influencing international affairs. The opportunity is related to the ideas 
and events in the external environment which constrain or enable actorness (ibid., p. 22), meaning 
that frames and shapes the EU action or inaction. The capability relates to: “the internal context of 
EU external action, or inaction” (ibid., p. 24). In response to opportunity and/or presence, the EU’s 
possibilities for external action are the ability to formulate effective policies (those that will 
capitalize on the presence or respond to opportunity) and the availability of appropriate policy 
instruments (ibid., p. 28); and understanding the EU’s ability to use those instruments (ibid., p. 
22). 
 
Opportunity is a dynamic process where ideas are interpreted and events are prescribed meanings. 
The interpretation of ideas and events is part of social interaction that is characteristic of 
international relations, as those social interactions give an understanding of the meaning of 
opportunity. For example, the opportunity of the EU is to act externally on behalf of its members 
to respond to globally oriented economic activities. One of the greatest opportunities for the EU 
presented the “return to Europe” Big Bang enlargement of Central and East European Countries. 
With the changed international system, the space for the EU opened as it felt historical 
responsibility to reconstruct Europe’s identity as well as the borders. Certainly, the EU character 
changed as the discourse became that the EU’s agenda is permanent and continues the enlargement 
process. Indeed, it seems clear that overlapping discourses of responsibility and inclusiveness 
(through enlargement) were central to the offer of future EU membership to the five countries of 
the Southern Balkans in 1999 (ibid., p. 24).  
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Contrary to opportunity, the EU’s presence shapes the perceptions, expectations, and behavior of 
others (ibid., p. 26). The presence does not have purposive external action as it is a consequence 
of being. It is mostly prescribed by external audiences, which are a combination of reputation and 
status. One of the policy-related aspects of presence is the economic influence with the Single 
Market and the euro currency. The Single Market has a magnetic effect as it can attract third 
countries to invest and the EC needs to respond to those demands actively. Additionally, internal 
factors can influence a third party and its expectation of the EU’s ability to act. In this stage, the 
issues of capability arise.  
  
The EU’s external action and aspects of the EU policy process, effective policies to capitalize on 
the presence or respond to opportunity is up to capability. Understanding the effectiveness of the 
EU’s policy process and the appropriateness/availability of policy instruments gives meaning to a 
third party as well internally, to the states in the EU. Capability draws upon, according to Sjöstedt 
(in Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, p. 28): a shared commitment to a set of overarching value; 
domestic legitimation of decision processes and priorities relating to external policy; the ability to 
identify priorities and formulate policies captured by the concepts of consistency and coherence, 
where: consistency indicates the degree of congruence between the external policies of the 
Member States and of the EU, and coherence refers to the level of internal coordination of EU 
policies; the availability of, and capacity to utilize, policy instruments: diplomacy/ negotiation, 
economic tools, and military means.  
 
To understand the EU’s choices by reference to their motivation and belief as well as the variety 
of forces constraining the EU, the concepts of opportunity and willingness need to be connected 
to the explanation of the EU capabilities, as well as behavior. As previously said, a decision-maker, 
with presented opportunity, has the willingness to choose one course of action over another. Thus, 
the behavior of the EU is composed of opportunity and willingness. For opportunity, the decision 
will vary of options, risk, and potential costs and benefits (Kinsella, Russett and Starr, 2013, p. 
18). Therefore, the EU’s opportunities are unquestionable. They operate in the domestic and global 
arena that permits interaction with others, and the EU has resources allowing certain kinds of action 
(ibid., p. 19).  
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The focus of this thesis will be the concept of willingness, which is the motivation that leads people 
to seize or decline opportunities (ibid., p. 18). Willingness derives from calculations of the costs 
and benefits flowing from an alternative course of action and informed by perceptions of the global 
scene and domestic political condition (ibid.). In this segment, we need to put constructivist glasses 
on, as the cost and benefit are very important to decision-makers, yet, decision-makers behave 
based on their perception of the world, which in fact may be very different from the way it appears 
to others (ibid.). In this case, the willingness of the EU involves the factor that affects how 
decision-makers see the post-conflict society, process information about what they see, formulate 
references, and ultimately make choices (ibid.).  
 
It is important to emphasize that the relation, possibly, can be compared to a person who comes to 
the restaurant and reads the menu. The Menu provides many possible behavioral opportunities, not 
determining what to choose, yet constraining what is possible. Additionally, on the menu, the 
person sees the price, the portion size, and ingredients that determine the final decision. The menu 
analogy helps us understand that the opportunities presented to international actors are constrained 
in various ways and that these constraints affect the willingness of decision-makers to act (ibid.). 
Hence, when presented with an opportunity, the EU has a willingness to choose a course of action 
that meets its goals which are in accordance with the EU’s values (democracy, equality, the rule 
of law, judiciary, etc.). To achieve its goals, the EU also needs to take into consideration the 
instruments under such a “menu” of choice and constraints that are at its disposal. 
2.2 Stabilization vs. Integration as an Application of Goals and Instruments in Post-
Conflict States  
According to Kamov, the EU is able to participate in the resolution of a given conflict in two ways: 
as an actor and as a framework (Kamov, 2006, p. 3). The EU particularly has at the disposal two 
main policies in conflict resolution: enlargement and neighborhood policy (ibid.). This subchapter 
will define enlargement policy in the EU’s relation with potential member candidates and the 
influence of the membership approaches towards the existing conflict. Particularly, the aim is to 
define the EU’s conflict resolution role in the enlargement area, to see the use of the enlargement 
process as a tool for conflict resolution.  
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The violent dissolution of the former Yugoslavia demonstrated the complete lack of preparedness 
of the EU (Kamov, 2006, p. 14) regarding an effective crisis management capability. The EU 
became aware that promoting peace and security in its neighbourhood is crucial and a necessity 
for the EU’s own security. Thus, the EU enhanced the enlargement policy to face several security 
challenges, which demanded an effective crisis management capability. This enables the EU to 
use the full range of its instruments (economic, political) in its immediate neighbourhood rather 
than on the broader international stage (ibid.).  
In the case of Central Europe and the three Baltic states, the EU pursued a strategy that first 
employed stabilization prior to integration. From the beginning of the enlargement, the 
stabilization overlapped with the perspective for membership in the EU, yet it was not successful 
with the countries from South-Eastern Europe until it was linked (although not explicitly) with the 
integration approach through the so-called Stability Pact. There were cases where the stabilization 
approach remained as such and did not envisage integration, for example, the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership of North Africa and the Middle East, which was based on economic and lesser political 
cooperation, yet remained without integration to the EU. In that aspect, Kamov (2006, p. 6) made 
a distinction between a so-called integration approach within the EU enlargement policy and a 
stabilization approach. The integration approach is widely regarded as the most successful foreign 
policy mechanism of the EU (Kamov, 2006, p. 6). The integration approach’s main focus is on 
achieving membership upon meeting the formal accession criteria via conditionality. It was 
defined at the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993, as a direct link between association 
and (future) membership, together with a mechanism of conditionality. It was the basis of the 
“Copenhagen criteria”, which set a series of benchmarks for the opening to the successful 
completion of entry negotiations (Kamov, 2006, p. 7). Those benchmarks were later incorporated 
in Art.49 of the TEU.  
The integration approach was used in the Cyprus enlargement process. The resolution of territorial 
disputes and minority issues was a necessary precondition for the EU membership of a given 
country, and the EU pursued negotiations between Cyprus, Turkey, and Greece. However, the EU 
adopted the following tactic at the 1999 Helsinki European Council. First, it confirmed that the 
resolution of the Cyprus conflict would not be a prerequisite for the accession of Cyprus to the 
EU. This ensured Greece and placed Turkey in a situation in which it could no longer block 
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Cyprus’ accession to the EU by refusing to negotiate a settlement of the conflict. Second, by giving 
Turkey a candidate status, the EU recognized that Ankara’s position on the conflict is crucial and 
aimed to provide it with a strong incentive. Although Turkey has been reluctant to recognize an 
explicit link between its own accession and the resolution of the Cyprus conflict, it certainly existed 
in the eyes of the EU. Thus, the EU established the membership perspective and the instruments 
of conditionality as its primary strategy towards the Cyprus conflict (Kamov, 2006, p. 35). 
After the Yugoslavian dissolution, Croatia and BiH were part of the Regional Approach at Zagreb 
Council, with the primary goal of the restoration of peace and stability, post-conflict rehabilitation, 
and the development of good neighbourly relations in the region (Trauner, 2009, p. 778). Likewise, 
Braniff (2011, p. 185) claims that the EU, by keeping in mind its experiences during the 1990s in 
the countries of the former Yugoslavia, changed its mechanisms for dealing with the situation in 
the Balkans, namely “integration and enlargement”. She argues that the post-2000 period of 
democratisation in Croatia (and Serbia) is seen as the period of the instrumentalisation and 
operationalisation of lessons learned from its previous engagement in the Balkans (Braniff, 2011, 
p. 185). 
The major shift of “integration and enlargement” was designed by the EC in 1996 (European 
Commission, 1999) when conditionality was adopted to the regional approach. On 29 April 1997, 
following the EC’s (European Council, 1997) report, the EU General Affairs Council adopted a 
regional approach introducing political and economic conditionality for the development of 
relations with countries in the region (Rodin, 2006, p. 360). 
The Regional Approach was a more ambitious response to the challenges posed by the changed 
situation on the ground and new political context (European Commission, 1999, p. 1). Under the 
Regional Approach, the EU described the countries of South-Eastern Europe as those who suffer 
from inter-ethnic tensions and conflicts (European Commission, 1999, p. 1). The year 1999 was 
characterized as a time of tremendous upheaval and uncertainty in the region, so the EU merged 
the resolution of instability and the general stabilization and development of the region, and linked 
it to the so-called Stability Pact. After the introduction of the Stability Pact, countries moved on 
the enlargement track. Since 2000, the EU has set in motion an SAP. It is a policy instrument that 
by resorting to a “contractual” relationship between the EU and the relevant states or entities tries 
 28  
 
to bridge the gap between “simple” stabilisation and “full” integration. The SAPs are modelled 
after the European Agreements and their successful implementation is a prerequisite for further 
integration (Kamov, 2006, p. 9).  
The approach was further developed in June 1999, following the EC’s proposal of 26 May for the 
creation of an SAP for the countries of South-Eastern Europe (GAC, 1999) (in Rodin, 2006, p. 
360). The main conditions to be complied with by those countries were specified as compliance 
with democratic principles, human rights and rule of law, respect for and protection of minorities, 
market economy reforms, regional cooperation, and compliance with obligations under Dayton 
international peace agreements and Peace Implementation Councils (Rodin, 2006, p. 360). 
Compliance with the above-mentioned criteria may qualify the countries concerned for (European 
Commission, 1999, p. 4):  
Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA); autonomous trade measures and other economic 
and commercial relations; economic and financial assistance (the Instrument for Pre-accession 
Assistance – IPA); aid for democratization and civil society; humanitarian aid for refugees, 
returnees, and others; cooperation on justice and home affairs; development of political dialogue.  
Thus, the idea of “security as a condition” (to achieve peace and security within and between 
themselves) turned around: the EU could play a role in achieving peace and security. Initiating 
accession negotiation with those candidate countries which were seriously affected by the crisis 
came to be regarded as the most powerful tool to provide such perspectives, and thus to create 
security and stability in the region (Kamov, 2006, p. 26). Therefore, the EU integration is a 
condition for stabilization rather than the other way round. In the WB states, the EU with SAP 
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3 The European Union’s Actorness Towards Post-Conflict States  
The fact is that we prepare for war like precocious giants, and for peace like retarded pygmies.  
                                                                                                             Laster B. Pearson 
                                                                                                              News summaries, 
                                                                                                            March 15, 1955 
 
This Chapter has three foci. First is the historical overview and conflict explanation of particular 
states so as to have a closer look into the particular case of a post-conflict state. The second one is 
to identify and note the global actors involved in these states. Lastly, the third is to investigate the 
beginning of the EU’s foreign policy relationship with individual states. The interest is not to focus 
on the EU involvement in the conflict, but to investigate how it developed its enlargement policy 
after the accession negotiations started concerning the post-conflict situation. The emphasis is on 
seeing wherever there was a connection between post-conflict resolution and the “general” EU 
integration. Thus, the emphasis is on enlargement policy values, or to ask, what were the value 
priorities in the assessments of the states. An extensive inquiry into the matter will examine how 
the path toward the EU varied for the three states.   
3.1 The European Union and the “Cyprus Problem”  
Cyprus, the third-largest island in the Mediterranean Sea, has a turbulent history involving many 
actors, ranging from different empires and nations to regional and global actors of today (Christou, 
2004, p. 29). Besides the diametrically opposed interests of Greece and Greek-Cypriots on the one 
hand and Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots on the other, there are other relevant international historical 
and geographical factors worth stating. Some of the latter are proximity to the Suez Canal, the 
colonial heritage and interests of Great Britain, remnants of the Cold War paranoia that the island 
was to become a Russian satellite or a “Cuba in the Mediterranean”, the British Sovereign Base 
Areas that host one of the biggest intelligence infrastructures in the region and close links between 
the Greek and Russian Orthodox churches. Hence, the continuing conflict on the island starts 
looking multi-layered, multi-factored, and multi-faceted (Dagli, 2017). 
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Based on the Zurich and London Agreements between Greece, Turkey, and two Cypriot 
communities, Cyprus gained independence from the British colonization on 16 August 1960 and 
is established as a presidential republic. The two communities share power, whereby the Greek in 
1960 constituted 82 % of the population and the Turkish Cypriot community made up only about 
18 % of the population. The power between the Greek Cypriot community and the Turkish Cypriot 
community is shared on a 70 % to 30 % basis. Shared power for many years has created numerous 
differences and divisions and separate communities. This has escalated with a plan to annex the 
islands to Greece (Enosis) or Turkey (Taksim) (European Parliament, 2000, p. 2). The reason why 
the constitution is based on shared power is to avoid and balance the strengths of the Greek and 
Turk Cypriots by preventing a numerically smaller group of Turkish Cypriots from being 
overpowered by the Greek Turks. In that sense, the President had to be a Greek Cypriot, elected 
by the Greek Cypriots, and the Vice-President a Turkish Cypriot, elected by the Turkish Cypriots, 
who have the right to a final veto. The newly established state of Cyprus was based on ethnic 
antagonism instead of democracy, and after three years of independence in 1963, new conflicts 
erupted (Crawshaw, 1964, p. 338).  
The 1963 conflict was based on violent clashes that would continuously be present on the island 
between the two communities, which were making decisions that do not have a constitutional 
basis. One year later, a new actor on the island was introduced, which is still present and is one of 
the most long-standing peacekeeping missions. As violent clashes were regarded as a threat to 
international security, the United Nations Security Council established the United Nations 
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) (European Parliament, 2000, p. 3). 
For the last 50 years, the UNFICYP has pursued the long and frustrating inter-communal talks 
with several United Nations (UN) settlement plans, but did not manage to lower the competition 
of the ethno-nationalistic Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot communities; it is usually read in 
tandem with the ‘motherland’ nationalism in Turkey and Greece (Dagli, 2017). Communities in 
the new federation were psychologically divided, which lead to a physical and demographic 
division and turned the island into a "diplomatic graveyard" even before the Turkish intervention 
in response to the Greek coup on the island in 1974 (ibid.). The 1974 coup d’etat against the 
President of Cyprus Makarios was the peak, which officially divided Cyprus into two parts: the 
Greek Cypriots living in the southern part under the legally recognized the RoC and the Turkish 
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Cypriots living in the unrecognized northern part, self-proclaimed, an administration called the 
TRNC (ibid.). European Community was not recognizing the TRNC and was not supportive of the 
so-called presidential election in June 1985 or the constitutional development in Northern Cyprus. 
Until this very day, travellers need to show their passports while crossing the border between the 
RoC and the TRNC. 
The 1974 division of Cyprus is visible on the local, regional and international levels. The local 
level between two ethnically divided communities is reflected in regional tensions between Turkey 
and Greece. Cyprus’ location in the region is politically and economically of great significance to 
the EU, and as such, was and still is appealing for the EU as it has historical ties with Greece, 
Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The already mentioned regional position in the eastern 
Mediterranean serves as a bridge between the Middle East and the North African counties; a bridge 
of mutual understanding and cooperation between the various religions, cultures, and ways of life. 
On the international level, the problem is pestering the UN since 1964, involving both North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United States. 
The relationship between Cyprus and the EU began in 1970, before the official division, and they 
were regarded as trading partners. Signing an Association Agreement between the Government of 
Cyprus and the European Economic Community was concluded in 1972 and entered into force on 
1 July 1973 (European Parliament, 2000, p. 11). Additionally, the Customs Union was also agreed 
to and was supposed to be completed in 1977. However, it was first extended to 1987 and with the 
start of the accession, negotiations became part of the accession process. In the year 1987, it was 
supplemented by a protocol that is still governing trade relations between the EU and Cyprus 
(Gaudissart, 1996, p. 16). As the relation between the EU and Cyprus was solemnly related to trade 
in the beginning, it did not have a significant impact on the conflict in Cyprus, except perhaps for 
the fact that they established a channel of communication between EU and the RoC.  
Since 2004, Cyprus officially became an EU Member State with all its “anomalies”, meaning 
Cyprus was integrated into the Union without a peace settlement (Dagli, 2017) and without the 
inclusion of Turkish-Cypriots (Cyprus accession process was conducted only by Greek-Cypriots, 
and the EU incorrectly addresses them as “Cyprus”, as this thesis will also continue to do). As 
Cyprus-EU communication was limited to the Greek-Cypriot leadership, excluding the Turkish-
Cypriots, it intensified deepening the divisions between communities and the intention of the 
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Turkish Cypriots to be a separate state.  The EU expressed the hope that the prospect of joining 
the EU would contribute toward finding a solution for the unification and accepted the application 
in 1993, supporting the UN’s efforts. Still, the Turkish side prolonged the status quo, and all 
solutions before 1998, when the accession talks started, had failed. 
3.2 The European Union and the Newest Member State Croatia  
For the first time since joining the EU in 2013, Croatia held the rotating Council Presidency from 
1 January to 30 June 2020 (European Parliament, 2019), which was not imaginable 30 years ago. 
The current Constitution of Croatia was adopted in 1990 and led to the declaration of independence 
from Yugoslavia in 1991 (Jović, 2006, p. 5). Having declared its independence, Croatia’s 
sovereignty and the process of state-building were afflicted by many tribulations (ibid.). 
Yugoslavia collapsed as it constitutionally guaranteed the right to “self-determination until 
secession”, meaning “paralleling the devolution of power within the party from the central organs 
of the leaderships of the republican and provincial organizations” (Burg, 1982, p. 131). That 
document was the legal basis for the referendum, which emerged due to the ethno-regional and 
economic differences and the “ideology of self-management” (ibid.). Slovenia was the first 
Yugoslavian republic that held a referendum on 23 December 1990, yet Croatia postponed it until 
May due to its significant Serbian minority. Both countries proclaimed their independence on June 
25, 1991. Croatia, again for the same reason, proclaimed a moratorium on the decision (ibid.).  
Nevertheless, the tribulations did not finish, quite the opposite. Croatia was involved in a military 
conflict both in BiH and in Croatia itself, where a deadly war, also known as the Homeland War 
(1991–1995), was fought to liberate a quarter of the country (mostly villages in the regions that 
are bordering with Serbia). It was the aggression of militant secessionist Serbian groups in Croatia 
and the political leadership of Yugoslavia (which was at the time under the leadership of Serbia). 
During that time, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was established, which was 
also operating in BiH, which managed to provide humanitarian assistance to the civilians. By the 
end of the war, the UNPROFOR was restructured and replaced with separate peacekeeping 
operations, which are no longer in Croatia. The war ended in 1995 with the liberation of the 
occupied territory and Croatia’s full state independence. It regained the same borders it had as a 
Yugoslav republic. The first international recognition of the new state came during the Homeland 
War, while other European countries followed up until the end of January 1992. On 22 May 1992, 
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Croatia became a member of the UN (Miroslav Krleža Institute of Lexicography, 2013). The 
declaration of independence of the Republic of Croatia explicitly guaranteed all national 
minorities, in particular the Serb minority, the respect of their civic, political, cultural, religious, 
and linguistic rights (ibid.). 
The relationship between the EU and Croatia started by signing the SAA in 2001. Yet, even though 
Croatia applied for the EU membership in 2003, negotiations and the screening stage of the 
accession negotiations started in October 2005. The two-year gap was the result of numerous ups 
and downs in the relations, mostly caused by the clumsy cooperation with the ICTY (Ott, 2006, p. 
5). It was the beginning of dynamic accession negotiations that lasted six years. Croatian 
negotiations were quite advanced in less than a year and busy with chapters on science and 
research, education, and culture, which were opened and provisionally closed. Yet, all other 
chapters went through various stages of multilateral and bilateral screening to fulfilling the 
requirements for opening the chapters according to the report from the EC. The most difficult ones 
were chapters on regional policy and coordination of structural instruments, judiciary, and 
fundamental rights, foreign security, and defence policy, and finally finance and budgetary 
provisions that did not even start the first explanatory stage of the screening (Ott, 2006, p. 6). Yet, 
taking into consideration that some chapters were truly more complicated than others, still, things 
in Croatia were changing rather slowly. Croatia intended to close the chapters faster than any of 
the previous candidates as they thought they could learn from the experience of the previous 
candidates. However, the truth was far away from the expectation and the EC in the conclusions 
of the Progress Report of 2005 stated that “Croatia needs to address the identified weaknesses and 
problems with determination” (Ott, 2006, p. 7).  
For the Croatian political elites, it was clear that this would not be a quick and easy job. The slow 
progress gradually stymied the initial enthusiasm, while Euroscepticism increased significantly. 
Despite the government’s pro-European campaign, the results of the Croatian accession 
referendum were among the lowest compared to previous acceding countries. The Croatian 
political elites started to be aware that despite all of the work done, it might happen that after the 
EU says “yes”, the Croatian population says “no” (Ott, 2006, p. 15). Among multiple 
factors contributing to this, the relatively weak awareness of citizens about the functioning of the 
EU and its institutions due to the Croatian government’s inadequate strategy of informing the 
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people were the most pronounced ones. Other contributing factors were educational and 
informational deficits of a considerable number of Croatian citizens and consequently their 
prejudices and lack of interest, bad perceptions of the activity of EU institutions due to their 
indecision and lack of support during the Homeland War, controversies regarding the judicial 
processes of the ICTY in The Hague, fear of becoming part of new Balkan integrations due to the 
inconsistency of EU policy in solving the post-war situation in former Yugoslavia, and fear of 
loss of sovereignty and foreign takeover of the domestic economy, the selling out of the real estate, 
destruction of agriculture, and suppression of domestic products by foreign ones (Maldini, 2016, 
p. 24). The cooperation with the ICTY was particularly problematic and unpopular in Croatia, as 
more than 80 % of Croats perceive general Gotovina as a war hero, not a criminal, and opposed 
his transferal to The Hague. It was visible for the Croatian political elites, that in comparison with 
other Central and East European states, the EU has set sticker criteria for Croatia (Roter and 
Bojinović, 2005, p. 451).  
Of all the above-mentioned obstacles, the hardest one was the required regional cooperation with 
other WB states, with which Croatia was in the Homeland War years ago. It was regarded as the 
EU attacks on Croatia’s sovereignty and national identity (Stafaj, 2014, p. 1710). Even though 
Croatia started to cooperate with the ICTY, established bilateral relations with neighbouring 
countries, and took regional initiatives, the success was short-lived: in December 2008, the 
neighbouring Slovenia blocked Croatia’s accession for ten months due to a dispute over the 
maritime border in the Gulf of Piran, by a proclamation by Croatian Parliament of an Ecological-
Fishing Protection Zone in the Adriatic. Since a single EU Member State has the power to halt EU 
accession of candidate countries, it was not until September 2009 that Slovenia decided to allow 
accession negotiations to continue and detach the border dispute from Croatia’s EU membership 
bid (Bojinović Fenko and Šabič, 2014, p. 59).   
After all accession negotiations were closed and Croatia met all the conditions, a few outstanding 
issues remained. The EU required Croatia to reform its tax regime. Finally, after surpassing all the 
obstacles, Croatia and the EU Member States signed an Accession Treaty on 9 December, 2011. 
Finally, Croatia became a Member of the EU on 1 July, 2013, remaining the SAA obligations, the 
outstanding Copenhagen criteria were met, and the Treaty was ratified by the national parliaments 
of all Members States (Stafaj, 2014, p. 1714). 
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3.3 The European Union’s Relationship with the Latest Applicant State Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  
The institutional structure of BiH emerged in 1995 with the Dayton Peace Accords that were 
signed to put an end to the violent conflict between Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks. The conflict as 
such is still not categorized neither as aggression nor as a civil war, yet can be observed as a 
mixture of both, where Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs opposed the emergence of a new 
Bosnian state, most violently and cruelly Europe witnessed after the Second World War. The war 
ended on 21 November, 1995 by the Dayton Peace Agreement (Chandler, 1999, p. 29).  
Under the Dayton Peace Agreement, the Constitution was drafted but it was supposed to be 
temporary. Nevertheless, it remains the highest legal act of BiH, under which BiH is a federation 
made upon two entities, one of which is a unitary state-like structure – Republic of Srpska (RS), 
and another decentralized federation itself, with 10 cantons – the Federation of BiH (FBiH). The 
constitution was supposed to be temporary to assure equality and to avoid any ethnic domination 
in the state structures. Because of that, Dayton's design makes central institutions of BiH very 
weak and not very efficient. Executive power is shared between the Presidency of BiH and the 
Council of Ministers (a division of labour is not clear so they mainly duplicate their executive 
tasks). The presidency is constituted out of three presidents or co-presidents – one Bosniak, one 
Croat, and one Serb who are elected for four years and rotate every eight months. The more and 
more one scratches the surface of the constitution, the more and more complex it seems. Yet, the 
most important is that the entities act as “a state within a state” (Boose, 2002, p. 74). Even FBiH 
cantons act like that: with its own legislature, a national assembly, and different arrangements. 
Moreover, the Brčko District with its own special administrative unit has its own status within the 
BiH, again with the autonomous government. So, the BiH is a country with a population of 
approximately 3.8 million that is governed by no less than 14 governments – one at the state level, 
two at the entity level, ten cantonal, and one for the District (Freedom House, 2004).  
BiH with its very complicated political system, of course, had problems with delivering an initial 
response to the political reforms set by the EU. The response was mixed and incoherent. Mixed 
because there was the verbal commitment of domestic actors and population, but in practice, there 
was no domestic political consensus on the reform agenda. The RS did not want to pass any 
legislation that could strengthen the state of BiH institutions and view every move as a threat to 
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the existence of the autonomous entity. Contrary, in the FBiH, Bosniak leaders aimed to abolish 
entities, and replace them with a central uniform state, which is also controversial. In the end, the 
talks about the political reforms started turning into a ping-pong match between Sarajevo (as the 
capital city and capital of the FBiH) and Banja Luka (the center of the RS institutions), and still, 
the match continues (particularly before the general elections, and during the NATO negotiations). 
The EC has viewed BiH’s response to the reform priorities as “slow and low-key” (European 
Commission, 2003), and constantly criticized BiH authorities (that were torn between Banja Luka 
and Sarajevo), signalizing that non-compliance will not be rewarded. As long as the ping-pong 
match is ongoing, the reforms are not expected to be adopted by BiH on their own. BiH is thus 
lagging behind other countries from the WB and is regarded as a “special case” to the EU officials.  
Additionally, the International Community is still present in the BiH. Signing the Dayton 
Agreement in 1995, the High Representative for BiH together with the Office of the High 
Representative (OHR) was created to oversee the civilian implementation of the Dayton 
Agreement. The OHR has the “Bonn Powers”, which is essential veto power, to avoid the 
obstruction of the Dayton Agreement by local nationalist politicians. Under the “Bonn Powers”, 
the OHR can adopt binding decisions when local parties seem unable or unwilling to act or remove 
public officials who violate legal commitments from the office. The Bonn Powers were used 
extensively until 2002, when BiH joined the CoE. That same year, the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the CoE complained against the actions of the OHR and required to transfer all powers to BiH 
authorities (OHR, 2015). In February 2008, the Peace Implementation Council set the conditions 
that needed to be fulfilled to close the OHR, and until today, several are completed. However, the 
OHR is still present in BiH, and the BiH population, NGOs, politicians do not feel comfortable 
with the closure of OHR. Yet, closure of the OHR is considered to be a pre-condition for EU 
membership and even for candidate status (Pantelić, 2010).  
Additionally, between 2002 and 2011, the OHR served as the EU Special Representative to BiH 
(EUSR). With the EUSR, the EU involvement in BiH was growing, that cumulated with opening 
of the Delegation of the EU to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2011. Since then, the EUSR and the 
Head of the EU Delegation Office have been vested in the same person (EUBIH, 2014). The Office 
is aimed to present, explain, and implement EU policy, as well to report development in BiH 
(ibid.). An interesting fact is that in the year 2009, as the EU officials thought it was important to 
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have experts regardless of their nationality, Cyprus was obstructing plans by the EU to reinforce its 
presence in BiH because it objected to the possible presence of non-EU citizens in the office of 
the EUSR (Vogel, 2009). At that time, Cyprus wanted to prevent Turkey from participating in the 
formulation of the EU policy. The Cypriot diplomats denied that Cyprus was against cooperation 
with third counties, but stressed that it would need “a clear legal and institutional framework” 
(ibid.). Greece supported the Cypriot stance, but the Cyprus objections did not pass as that decision 
would block other expert nationalities as those of the United States, that need to be involved in the 
Balkans to support EU policy.   
Nevertheless, the relation BiH-EU started in March 2000, as BiH received a Road Map with 18 
key conditions that needed to be fulfilled before the start of the SAP. In 2003, BiH was identified 
as a potential candidate country. The official negotiation on the SAA started in November 2005. 
The agreement was finally signed in June 2008. The same year, the process of visa liberalisation 
started, and since December 2010, citizens of BiH can travel without a visa to all Schengen area 
states. Only in June 2015 did the SAA enter into force. BiH submitted the membership application 
to the EU in February 2016. In December 2016, BiH received the accession questionnaire from 
the EC (Grünther-Đečević, 2017). Today, being in the applicant state, BiH holds Potential 
candidate membership status in the EU.  
Since 2008, BiH membership in the EU is conditional upon the completion of 174 criteria, as set 
by the EU. As a result, BiH’s path toward accession has been slow, lacking clarity and consistency. 
Moreover, as a post-conflict state, BiH does not have the institutional capacity necessary for a 
conditional integration framework. The institutional setup of BiH, by the Dayton Peace 
Agreement, is very complex with an overabundance of bureaucracies blocking decision-making 
processes. Moreover, every institution on every level has a power-sharing among the three 
constituent peoples, hence, decision led to a gridlock (Dobriković, 2012, p. 34).  
According to Progress Report 2008 (European Commission, 2008, p. 7), the political criterion was 
defined in six areas: constitution, parliament, government, public administration, the judicial 
system, anti-corruption policy. Since then, all segments had “very little progress”, “limited 
progress”, “some progress”, “no progress” (ibid.), or from “no progress” to “little progress”. There 
was another way around situations from “advancing” to “limited” (European Commission, 2009). 
The lack of progress was connected to the complicated state constitution, complicated decision-
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making process that does not allow any structural reform, and of course the ethnicization of the 
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4  Enlargement Policy Goals for Post-Conflict States  
 
In this chapter, I research how the EU formulated accession policies for a particular chosen state. 
The main aim of this chapter is to define policy goals, to see whether policy goals have been altered 
according to policy results. Regarding the post-conflict states, it is important to investigate whether 
they were defined as post-conflict states in the initial assessment by the EC, and based on that, 
were the EU policy goals defined accordingly.  
4.1 Cyprus  
Resolution of European Parliament (1999)  stated that Cyprus applied for membership to the EC 
on 4 July 1990. In 1993, the EC considered the application as made in the name of the whole 
island. A month later, the EC issued an Opinion on Cyprus application, in which European identity 
and character were recognized. The Council fully endorsed this Opinion on 4 October 1993 and 
supported the EC's approach which was to propose, without awaiting a peaceful, balanced and 
lasting solution to the Cyprus problem, to use all the instruments offered by the Association 
Agreement to help, in close cooperation with the Cypriot Government, with the economic, social 
and political transition of Cyprus towards integration into the EU (High Commission of the 
Republic of Cyprus, 2019). Afterward, EC issued “Agenda 2002” in 1997, where the EC’s 1993 
opinion was reaffirmed, adding that (European Commission, 1997):  
Agreement on a political settlement would permit a faster conclusion to the negotiations. If progress 
towards a settlement is not made before the negotiations are due to begin, they should be opened 
with the Government of the Republic of Cyprus as the only authority recognized by international 
law.  
Ergo, from the opening of accession negotiations in March 1998, the EU’s position had been that 
a reunited Cyprus should have acceded to the EU, but that the solution of the Cyprus problem did 
not constitute a precondition for accession and that accession negotiation to start with Cyprus 
means that they could start before a political settlement is reached (ibid.).  
In the Resolution of the Regular Report from the EC on Cyprus “progress towards accession” is 
stated (European Commission, 1999): the EU recognizes the only government in accordance with 
the UN Resolution and will focus on the southern part of the island, since reliable data about the 
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north are lacking due to the lack of willingness of the leadership in the northern part to cooperate 
with the EC. However, if the northern part of Cyprus decides to integrate and take place in the 
context of the Cyprus accession of the EU, it will not raise major difficulties, because of its 
relatively small size and its potential, in particular in terms of agriculture and tourism. It calls the 
Cypriot government to include representatives of the Turkish-Cypriot community in Cypriot 
delegation to the accession, and to constantly keep that possibility in mind as a preferred option. 
On other hand, the Report calls the Turkish-Cypriot side to participate directly in substantive talks 
on solving the Cyprus problem based on the UN resolution, as according to UN figures, the 
northern part of Cyprus is in majority populated by mainland Turks. Additionally, the EC calls the 
Council to put pressure on Turkey by clearly indicating that the quality of the EU-Turkey relations 
also depends on the Turkish attitude toward the solution of the Cyprus problem (ibid.). In return, 
the Greek government needs to lift its opposition to the EU financial assistance being provided to 
Turkey in the framework of the EU-Turkey customs union. And most importantly (ibid.): “/…/ 
whereas the solution of the Cyprus problem will be facilitated by the unhindered continuation 
of the accession negotiations; insisting however that the accession negotiations should be kept 
separate from efforts to find a solution to the Cyprus problem. Thus, since 1999 it was obvious the 
accession to the EU is one thing, and the solution for the Cyprus problem is a completely parallel, 
different process, despite the fact those were inter-related. 
Therefore, Cyprus as such was never defined as a post-conflict state, as all European institutions, 
as well as the academic papers, refer to the phenomena as “the Cyprus problem”, “the Cyprus 
issue” or “the Cyprus question” (European Parliament, 1999). It was very clear, that non-solution 
to the Cyprus question would not have any effect on their path to the EU. Moreover, the European 
Parliament welcomed that decision, again urging the Turkish Cypriots to join the delegation of the 
legal Government of Cyprus (European Parliament, 2000). Those were the attempts to use the EU 
Accession and the prospect of final membership as a motivation to a settlement of the conflict, not 
a precondition. This expectation was repeatedly asserted in all EU decisions and statements 
concerning Cyprus (European Commission, 2002).  
The EU accession and the solution for the Cyprus problem are completely different things. The 
spotlight was focused on the UN Secretary-General to promote a solution, as the EU hoped UN 
Resolutions will provide the solution. As the accession talks continued, the UN’s efforts intensified 
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with the Annan Plan in 2002. The Plan made a basis for an agreement for the reunification, where 
there will be a federation of two states, and the negotiations were moving towards finalisation. On 
the other side, the EU accession was regarded as the “best tool” to ensure the reunification, only 
because the EU was in the accession negotiations with Turkey, especially given Turkey’s interest 
to join the EU. The EU offered an appetizing carrot, and presented Turkey with a potentially 
harmful stick, hoping it will increase the willingness of Turkish Cypriots to compromise. At that 
time, it seems that the EU accession was seen as a “shield” against potential Turkish military action 
and diplomatic advantage (Euroactiv, 2015). 
The only way Northern Cyprus could benefit was to follow political settlement with constitutional 
solutions that will grant the Greek Cypriot federal position and the Turkish Cypriot confederate 
proposal. For Turkish Cypriots, the carrot of the EU membership was automatically conditional 
upon a settlement (Tocci, 2003, p. 106). Unfortunately, the Annan Plan was not accepted, Greek 
Cypriot leaders rejected it because the UN Security Council had not provided guarantees on post-
reunification security in their opinion (Wrights, 2004). The EU accepted Cyprus, specifying that 
the TRNC is not a part of the EU, however, once the island is reunited, Turkish Cypriots, in the 
same way as all East Germans will be citizens of the EU (Tocci, 2003, p. 106). 
Thus, 16 years after Cyprus became the EU member state, the Cyprus problem is still present. It 
all cumulated with the inability to resolve its internal security problem (Nugent, 2003, p. 11). The 
reunification did not happen, and the Greek Cypriots were not in support of reunification. At the 
same time, circles in Brussels have become more sympathetic to the Turkish-Cypriots, who in 
practice remained outside the EU, despite favouring reunification (Euroactiv, 2015). Cyprus 
enjoys full EU membership and it does not exercise any control in the northern part of Cyprus. 
However, Turkish Cypriots are EU citizens (European Commission, 2020) and acquis 
communautaire is suspended in the TRNC. The northern part of Cyprus has a peculiar status 
concerning the EU. Even as it de facto comes closer to Turkey, it remains de jure part of the EU. 
However, while it is formally part of the EU, the acquis communautaire is suspended unless and 
until the island is reunified. 
Even though the EU wanted to use the stabilization approach in order to use enlargement process 
as a tool for island unification, it ultimately happened to be a rather integration prior to the 
stabilization approach, as the unification did not become conditional upon the enlargement 
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process.  Brussels is still not a participant in the settlement of the Cyprus problem, as Cyprus was 
not from the start defined as a post-conflict state, and the EU did not base their enlargement policy 
instruments in that regard. Greek Cypriots, behind the newly acquired EU membership, remain 
with limited incentives to compromise in inter-communal conflicts. Despite the increased 
importance of the EU in the northern part of the island, the pro-European views of the Turkish 
Cypriots were recited, thereby limiting Brussels's ability to resolve the Cyprus problem (Bahcheli, 
2001, p. 93). 
4.2 Croatia  
The official web page of the EC (European Commission, 2013) stated: 
On Monday 1 July, Croatia will become the 28th Member State of the EU. Croatia's accession 
marks another milestone in the construction of a united Europe. It also provides fresh evidence of 
the transformative power of the EU: torn by conflict only two decades ago, Croatia is now a stable 
democracy, capable of taking on the obligations of EU membership and of adhering to EU 
standards. 
Thus, Croatia became the EU member state, the only one from the WB states. The accession path 
started after the SAP was accomplished. Croatia successfully held the elections after the Zagreb 
crisis (street protests and series of corruption from the previous parliamentary term) and that led 
the EC to the conclusion (European Commission, 2000, p. 4):  
The new Croatian leadership has the opportunity to put Croatia on a fully democratic path and 
rapidly to prove its commitment to solving the outstanding political questions which have so far 
hampered a substantial development of EU - Croatia relations. /…/ The new Government is 
encouraged to undertake the necessary steps in order to enable the European Community to broaden 
its assistance and prepare a report on the feasibility of the opening of negotiations for an SAA. 
Until then, political dialogue, and cooperation within the Consultative Task Force, will be useful 
instruments with which to encourage reform and follow developments. 
Even though under the Regional Approach, all states from the WB are defined as those who suffer 
from conflict, the purpose of this chapter is to determine whether the EU regarded Croatia as a 
post-conflict state. For this purpose, I analysed the 2005 Croatia Progress Report. Regarding 
Croatia, the Progress Reports do not define Croatia as post-conflict via a direct reference to “a 
post-conflict state”. Yet, as mentioned before, the attention would be put on the elements of the 
former Yugoslav dissolution. Though the Report, the word “war” appears 113 times and it is 
mainly in connection with the war crime trials, which appear 15 times in the Report (European 
Commission, 2005). The most repeated concept was the ICTY (47 times in the Report) and 
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Croatia’s cooperation with the ICTY, as it was a condition defined by the SAP, a fundamental 
element of EU policy (European Commission, 2005, p. 10).  
Additionally, under the definition of a post-conflict state, which was presented earlier by Brown, 
Lander and Stewart (2011, p. 5), post-conflict states need to have peace milestones. All eight of 
them were required to be fulfilled in the Regional Approach, particularly the establishment of a 
functional state, achieving reconciliation and social integration, and economic recovery. The 
priority of the EU in the WB was state-building, democracy-building, and market reforms 
(Noutcheva, 2012, p. 55). Thus, Croatia was de facto regarded as a post-conflict state, and 
additionally, the EU demanded domestic transformation, which was conditional, thus using the 
stabilization approach to create security and stability in the state and development of the region, 
using the SAP for conflict resolution.  
The EU was fully aware of the post-conflict situation in Croatia. Interestingly enough, on 14 April 
2003, Croatia submitted its membership application. The EC analysed Croatia’s suitability to be 
given a candidate country status in 2004, the same year Cyprus became an EU member state. The 
analysis said that Croatia was a functioning democracy with stable institutions guaranteeing the 
rule of law, functioning market economy which should be able to cope with competitive pressure 
within the EU in the medium term, with a precondition that it continues implementing reforms 
(Samardžija and Staničić 2004, p. 98). However, the Council decided to start negotiations 
conditioned by full cooperation with the ICTY and handing over Mladen Markač and General Ante 
Gotovina (who were involved in Operation Storm) as the ICTY indicted them on war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. So, even before the official negotiations started, Croatia faced the first 
political conditionality – the demand to arrest General Gotovina. In the end, the resilience of the 
EU proved sufficient and in October 2005, General Gotovina was arrested so the accession 
negotiations could finally start (Roter and Bojinović, 2005, p. 451).  
As Croatia was defined as a post-conflict state, the enlargement policy goal was based on the SAP, 
and Croatia’s path to joining the EU had more requirements compared to the previous candidate 
states. Croatia was the best “student” from the group who faced additional requirements and 
preconditions (like respect for minority rights, the return of refugees, and regional cooperation), 
the former candidates did not. From the start of accession negotiations, the EU sent a clear 
message: the EU valued the conditionality (that it was allowed under the SAP) and an applicant 
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country’s failure to comply would bring the accession process to an abrupt standstill (Stafaj, 2014, 
p. 1710). As for the traditional Copenhagen political criteria the protection of minorities, especially 
the Serbs and Roma, and the implementation of agreements with the force of law that facilitated 
the return of Serb refugees, they were flagged as areas for political improvement (Roter and 
Bojinović, 2005, p. 448). In the end, the emphasis was on put on Chapters 23 and 24 that did not 
exist in negotiations during Big Bang enlargement (Bojinović Fenko and Urlić, 2015, p. 114). 
Particularly Chapter 23 was (in)famous, as it was active towards the end of accession negotiations, 
and become a centre of accession negotiations with Montenegro and with Serbia (Vlašić Feketija 
and Lasowski, 2014, p. 16). Chapter 23 is in the question of the judiciary, the fight against 
corruption, fundamental rights, and EU citizen’s rights (ibid.). The additional “help” was provided, 
however, under the Negotiating Framework for Croatia any serious breach of the benchmark set 
for the opening of negotiations and the fundamental values, can suspend membership. 
Chapter 23 showed that the EU set an unprecedentedly exacting benchmark for the opening and 
closure of negotiating chapters (Phinnemore, 2013, p. 30). Benchmark was set in four areas: 
judiciary, fight against corruption and organized crime, fundamental rights, and the ICTY 
cooperation (ibid.). Those benchmarks were divided into sub-benchmarks with a focus on the 
implementation of measures and the establishment of track records. Overall, Croatia had to fulfil 
three opening benchmarks and ten closing benchmarks; with a number of very detailed sub-
benchmarks (Vlašić Feketija and Lasowski, 2014, p. 16). The differences in the modus operandi 
of accession negotiation (strict conditionality and progress to the next phase of rapprochement 
depend on the performance of the aspiring countries) were prescribed to the WB states, still, it is 
not only connected to post-conflict states. It is in relation to the previous unsatisfactory experience 
with Bulgaria and Romania, which put rule of law at the core of negotiation. Besides the fact the 
EU membership does not have a magic transformative power, an important lesson learned from 
previous enlargements was that countries show a poor implementation of political criteria once the 
Accession Treaty is signed (Bojinović Fenko and Urlić, 2015, p. 129). Additionally, differences 
in the modus operandi of accession negotiation were a product of reduced appetite among further 
expansion of the EU (Vlašić Feketija and Lasowski, 2014, p. 5). 
Croatian Chief Negotiator, Vladimir Drobnjak, jokingly concluded: “We will probably be the best-
prepared candidate ever to enter the EU because the rules of the game are such that one is either 
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perfect or one cannot enter the Union. That is the way it is” (Drobnjak, 2009).  In the comparison 
of Cyprus’ enlargement, a newly formed set of benchmarks in accession negotiations with Croatia 
are one of the main novelties in assessing compliance with accession conditions (Bojinović Fenko 
and Urlić, 2015, p. 116). Hence, in the case of Croatia, the EU valued the conditionality. As 
Chapter 23, regional cooperation and protection of minorities were at the core of the accession 
negotiations the EU used the stabilization approach (the approach that would be used in further 
expansion) intending to provide stabilisation and integration, combined with strict use of the 
conditionality principle. 
4.3 Bosnia and Herzegovina  
As is the case with Croatia and all the WB states under the Regional Approach, BiH was defined 
as suffering from conflict. Observing the Progress Report of BiH in the year 2005 (European 
Commission, 2005, p. 27), the same year as previously discussed Croatia’s Progress report, the 
word “war” appears 22 times and is also in relation with war crime trials (domestic war crimes 
trials and the ICTY). Additionally, the emphasis was put on the return of refugees and displaced 
persons to their pre-war areas (European Commission, 2005, p. 29). The section where BiH is 
categorized as a post-conflict state is placed under the title Democracy and the rule of law 
(European Commission, 2014, p. 6). When observing the progress BiH made towards meeting the 
Copenhagen political criteria, the starting point is to observe the stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law (ibid.). Thus, the starting point is the Constitution of 
BiH. It clearly stated that (European Commission, 2014, pp. 6–7):  
The Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement (DPA) put an end to the 1992–1995 war and brought peace to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The country’s Constitution, which is Annex 4 to the DPA, established a 
complex institutional architecture that remains inefficient and is subject to different interpretations. 
The complicated decision-making process, lack of shared vision, and weak cooperation between 
the various levels of government have delayed structural reforms and hampered the country’s 
progress towards the EU.  
 
Hence, BiH was directly categorized as a post-conflict state and the one that suffers from the 
conflict, as it presents the obstacle to move forward in the path to the EU. Additionally, BiH did 
not envisage the SAA stage, as the legacy of the war was present. From the start of the BiH-EU 
relations, the EU saw that BiH needs to pass the phase of a heavier reconstruction, and an 
additional phase of political and economic consolidation, particularly in the field of institution 
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building and economic reform (European Commission, 2000). According to the EC Conclusions 
of January 2000 (European Commission, 2000):  
The main problems of the country are the lack of consensus on a common statehood, general 
weakness of the institutions, and an underdeveloped civil society. State institutions need to be 
developed and new coordination mechanisms at the entity and local level are needed to ensure 
effective and coherent action on the part of the country as a whole. A substantial improvement in 
the functioning of the State is essential for rapprochement to the European structures. BiH 
authorities at all levels are expected to commit themselves to this end, for which specific assistance 
will be made available.  
 
BiH with its post-war legacy and the complicated system was a type of a case that the EU has not 
faced before. In the case of BiH, the EU’s conditionality is directly targeting the country’s internal 
sovereignty by demanding a change in the internal balance of power between the central 
government and the two constituent entities (the RS and the FBiH). The EU requested “a 
redefinition of the relationship between the entities and the state” and affected the relationship 
between the external authority structure in the country (the OHR) and the domestic authority 
structures (the political institutions of BiH) (Noutcheva, 2012, p. 56). At the same time, a high 
level of economic harmonisation was demanded (achieving stronger and sustainable economic 
growth), to advance the political goal of building institutions stronger, building a more efficient 
public sector and a more dynamic private sector development (European Commission, 2016, p. 
30). Therefore, in the case of BiH concerning security and stability, the first task was to focus on 
the states as such, then to proceed to the second task of the SAP, and regional cooperation. In this 
case, the SAP was the bridge between stabilisation and integration, however, formal accession 
criteria were based on the improvement of political and economic stability, via conditionality, 
using the stabilization approach.  
As the Copenhagen criteria emphasized political and economic stability and the role of democracy 
in providing it, it was obvious BiH would first need to satisfy the basic criteria, then work on the 
SAP conditions and additional requirements. The additional condition that was requested was to 
amend the constitution to reflect the ruling in the Sejdić and Finci v. BiH case from the Council of 
Europe’s European Court of Human Rights (European Commission, 2014, p. 4).2  
 
2 Jokob Finci and Dervo Sejdić, are a Jew and a Roma who sued the state of BiH, arguing that the BiH’s Constitution 
is discriminatory. Only three constitutional nations’ representatives can run for office in BiH’s presidency or the House 
of the Peoples, thus the “others” cannot. In December 2009, the European Court of Human Rights ruled in favour of 
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It seems that the EU realized that the task to reform the BiH constitution was overreaching and, in 
the end, did not make constitutional reform as a requirement for membership. In the Council 
Decision, BiH needs to (The Council of the European Union, 2008, p. 27): continue the process to 
agree on and adopt changes to the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina that will contribute to 
creating more functional and fiscally sustainable institutional structures, improving respect for 
human and fundamental rights and supporting the process of European integration. As it was not 
imperative for BiH to reform the constitution under the Decision of Council, BiH did not reform, 
and neither did it provide an effective measure to have ensured a new constitution.  
An additional deadlock situation after the start of the SAA negotiations appeared in 2005. The EC 
demanded that BiH reform its police apparatus in line with three criteria to enable it to sign the 
SAA. These criteria comprised of: the relocation of budgetary and legislative decisions from entity 
level to the state level, redrawing police districts on technical rather than political terms, and the 
elimination of political interference in police matters (Van Gerwen, 2016, p. 47). That would mean 
reducing the capacity of the RS officials to protect and harbour war criminals and to obstruct the 
return of refugees (ibid.). 
The political leadership of the RS was willing to pay the price of not choosing European accession 
to maintain the status-quo on police reform matter. The EU conditionality, thus, proved insufficient 
to entice domestic actors into action while the next step in the accession process was dangling in 
front of them (Vasilev, 2011, p. 59). However, the EU was determined and so, imposed the 
equation “no police reform = no SAA”. Eventually, the EU conditionality proved to be ineffective 
in overcoming this situation, and with the adoption of two purely technical laws, the matter was 
closed. The laws were far away from demand, and crucial reforms have not been completed 
(European Commission, 2004, p. 35). The political leaders from the RS started to argue that the 
RS had the right to hold a referendum on secession, and the EU efforts to soften their rhetoric were 
rather unsuccessful.  
 
 
Sejdić and Finci, demanding constitutional reform necessary for the EU accession (Minority Rights Group, 2016). 
That would mean having a condition that will change the status quo of ethnic nationalist that is not in their favour, 
making this the most difficult task the BiH needs to perform (Zdeb, 2019, p. 604).  
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5 Enlargement Policy Instruments for Post-Conflict States 
 
This chapter focuses on the course of action, or the EU's capability in the formulation of the EU 
policy instruments specific to the post-conflict states in question. Focusing on the EU capability, 
the research will make a distinction between stabilisation and integration approach, to see how the 
EU used instruments for political conditions and post-conflict state elements.  Here I will research 
the differences of the stabilisation and integration approach, how it varied among the three post-
conflict states, and how the EU used policy instruments to achieve its goals. As previously defined, 
capability draws on the policy instruments as diplomacy/negotiations and economic tools.  
Additionally, this Chapter would observe the CoE reports regarding respect to human rights and 
freedom, as BiH is not a member state of the EU. Also, the CoE monitors how well countries 
applied the standards they sign for. It also provides technical assistance, often working together 
with the EU, to help them do so (Council of Europe, n.d.). 
5.1 Cyprus  
Cyprus accession negotiation included 28 sectorial chapters, focusing on the adoption and 
implementation of EU legislation and institutional capacity building (Dobrikovic, 2012, p. 20). In 
the final Regular Report on Cyprus, the year 2002, the EU concluded (European Commission, 
2002, p.123): “In the accession negotiations, 28 chapters have been provisionally closed. Cyprus 
is generally meeting the commitments it has made in the negotiations”. The EU categorised criteria 
requirements into four areas: political, economic, acquis-related, and prospects for a political 
settlement regarding the Cyprus problem (ibid.). With the Copenhagen political criteria, Cyprus 
did not have so many problems. Regarding the political requirements, the state public 
administration was improved through a new post and regular training. The economic reform met 
the economic requirements of the EU accession, and the EU required improvements to liberalise 
the telecom, energy, air transport, and postal service sectors (European Commission, 2002, p. 120). 
Cyprus implemented the acquis, although further efforts remain to be made.  
Observing the CoE’s Report of the Political Affairs Committee from 2002, CoE saw that the 
negotiations were proceeding smoothly from a technical point of view. Regarding respect of 
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human rights and freedom, unrecognised northern administration violates human rights of Greek 
Cypriots who became internally displaced people; and do not have freedom of movement 
(Adamide and Constantinou 2011). The CoE urged the two sides to make a political agreement as 
it is most desirable before the entry to the EU. The report noted that the European Court of Human 
Rights has upheld that the refusal to allow the return of the displaced Greek Cypriots to their homes 
in the northern part of the island constitutes a violation of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Political Affairs Committee, 2002). 
Under the decision of the Court, Turkey is obliged to secure all human rights in Northern Cyprus.  
With problems of legality and politics, the Cyprus problem creates inherent contradictions for the 
EU project. As already stated, the EU did not require a conditional resolution to the Cyprus 
problem, as it was assumed it would follow the member-state status. Cyprus did not confront inner 
problems and the EU could not insist on the conditionality of the unification. Even the EU required 
a unified Cyprus, yet the interaction between Greek Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot, and Turkish interests 
on the one hand and the EU policies of conditionality on the other probably produced some kind 
of crisis rather than settlement (Tocci, 2003, p. 136).  
From the final Regular Report on Cyprus (European Commission, 2002, p. 120), Cyprus was 
regarded as the state that continues to respect human rights and freedoms and improved the 
procedure for the protection of refugees. It has abolished restrictions on the right to marry for 
Turkish Cypriots living in the south. In the field of free movement of persons, Cyprus has taken a 
major step by adopting the framework legislation on the recognition of professional qualifications. 
It has abolished inconsistencies in regards to the coordination of social security systems and has 
reached a good level of administrative capacity (European Commission, 2002, p. 121). Thus, 
regarding the commitments, Cyprus is capable of fulfilling its duties of Member State, even as it 
is in a “frozen conflict”, still, it does not have any casualties.  
The decision to continue with Cyprus integration without a solution to the Cyprus issue is on the 
one hand a product of the geopolitics at that time. At that time, if the EU either chose to require or 
to not require a settlement, that would imply that the EU chose the side with one of the conflicting 
parties. The EU member state Greece backed up the Greek Cypriots, and since 2008 the interstate 
negotiations have been slow, as the Greek Cypriots deployed their EU membership to "transfer" 
their preferences to the EU level and secure concessions from those parties to the conflict outside 
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of the Turkish Cypriots, and Turkey in particular, as it was regarded as the fundamental supporter 
of the TRNC (Bahcheli, 2001, p. 218). At that time, Turkey had a long-standing ambition of 
accession to the EU, and the EU recognized that in order to achieve a settlement in Cyprus, 
incentives have to be offered to Turkey if the ‘power of attraction’ is to change minds in Ankara. 
As is pointed out by Bahcheli: “/…/ western officials believe that since EU membership is so 
highly prized by Turkish leaders, Ankara would agree to a negotiated Cyprus settlement along 
federal lines…” (ibid.). In the end, assuming that the Cyprus issue can be solved by pushing 
Ankara to change its mind and adopt a more compromising stance on Cyprus for the benefit of 
accession was a poor assessment (Diez and Tocci, 2013, p. 201). Hence, maybe the conditionality 
of unified Cyprus was on Turkey, during their accession negotiations, which is not within the scope 
of this thesis. 
Meantime, the Greek Cypriot community saw the EU's role in the Cyprus peace process to be 
linked to the strength of the EU law and norms to shape certain aspects of the Cyprus dispute. 
According to Kaymak (2006, p. 15), the Greek Cypriot elite wanted: “to ensure that the solution 
to Cyprus dispute will help maintain the legality and continuity of the Republic of Cyprus and 
consolidate sovereignty. It is obvious that the concept of a “European solution” has become a 
political model of support by the Greek Cypriot ruling elite to strengthen the centrifugal tendencies 
in this country after reaching a solution and linking to the active implementation of the legal legacy 
of the Union after reaching an agreement”. 
The EU accession has failed to become a catalyst, or motivation, for resolving the Cyprus question. 
Quite the opposite, EU membership was seen as a means of strengthening the diplomatic position 
of the Greek Cypriots towards the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey (Kyris, 2012, p. 87). Even Turkish 
Cypriots, despite skepticism, realised the benefits of reunification, and were in favour of Annan’s 
plan. The pre-accession period of Cyprus was a period of support for Turkey and the Turkish 
Cypriots to resolve the existing dispute as a prerequisite for accession to the EU. Because of the 
closeness of the EU to the Turkish Cypriot side, the EU was criticized, as the Turkish Cypriot 
intellectuals and civil society were more into the “1960 state of affairs” (Kaymak and Vural, 2006, 
p. 16). Its tradition and “European experience” in federalism and human rights enable the EU to 
develop a vision of a united and politically stable Cyprus towards resolving controversies on 
issues, such as the distribution of constitutional competences within the federal framework, the 
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restoration, and limitation of property rights and the implementation of human rights (Kaymak, 
2006, pp. 22–23). 
Yet, the gap that existed between Turkey's and Turkish Cypriots’ strategies regarding the EU 
conditionality has disappeared and has led to a genuine transformation of existing policies. 
However, Greek Cypriot did not have any willingness nor interest as it was not a requirement in 
their EU path. They already safeguarded their accession to the EU. The EU used a variety of 
diplomatic and political instruments on both sides, as well on Turkey, yet the EU did not insist on 
the integration approach and had the burden of geopolitics on their side. This reaffirms that EU 
membership can be an important and powerful tool in initiating reforms, yet not a tool to resolve 
conflicts through the enlargement process (Kyris, 2012, p. 9).  
5.2 Croatia  
Keeping in mind the EU integration as a peace project, with peace and prosperity at its core, the 
case of Croatia was challenging to the EU as it brought the sharp perspective of the WB’ recent 
past. The accession of Croatia also incorporates pacification and stabilisation in the WB, which 
was necessary for political stability and economic development (Boutherin, 2013, p. 1). During 
the initiation of the SAP, the EU used the enlargement policy instruments based on diplomacy and 
negotiation, economic tools, as well as international pressure. Additionally, the EU provided 
financial tools in the process (Boutherin, 2013, p. 2):  the CARDS programme (2000–2006) and 
the IPA (2007–2013). In this view; the EU has invested €4.65 billion between 2000 and 2006 and 
€5.2 billion in 2007–2013 (ibid.). It was an additional encouragement to cope with conditions 
presented and provided economic development to underdeveloped states that have been able to 
make up for the lost time in a record period (ibid.). The core condition became regional 
cooperation, as there cannot be a European perspective without the input by all parties in this 
direction (ibid.). 
Under the 2005 Progress Report, Croatia had the help in the form of a European Partnership, which 
assisted the Croatian authorities in their efforts to meet the accession criteria (European 
Commission, 2005). Regarding the political criteria, Croatia made progress most significantly in 
the area of regional cooperation during the year and needed to enhance bilateral issues regarding 
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border issues between Slovenia and Croatia, which dated from the breakup of Yugoslavia, 
(Euractiv, 2009).  
Neither the regional cooperation nor other conditional political criteria were welcomed within the 
population, as was visible at the referendum on Croatia’s membership to the EU. However, it gave 
a new perspective to renewed trade with its neighbours (Boutherin, 2013, p. 4). From a regulatory 
and infrastructural point of view, Croatia was able to take full advantage of the economic benefits 
of its membership (ibid.). The EU succeeded because it has created a community of shared destiny 
among the states and obligatory regional solidarity between Croatia and Serbia. Initiatives towards 
presenting official apologies have been taken on both banks of the Sava. Hence, on 29 April 2013, 
Vesna Pusić, Vice President of the Croatian government and Foreign Minister, and Aleksandar 
Vučić, Vice President of the Serbian government and Defence Minister, discussed a joint agenda 
which included the settlement of on-going issues linked to the conflict, economic cooperation after 
Croatia’s accession and Serbia’s future membership (ibid.).   
However, the 2010 CoE recommendations regarding human rights issues presented obstacles. The 
report sets out recommendations about the human rights of displaced persons and asylum seekers, 
proceedings relating to post-war justice, and the situation of Roma (CoE, 2012). It is the 
fundamental rights of all displaced persons to voluntarily return in safety and dignity, and Croatia 
has to provide specific care, reparation, and full access to justice to vulnerable groups of migrants, 
such as victims of torture and ill-treatment, victims of trafficking, and unaccompanied or separated 
children (ibid.). The report welcomed the cooperation with the ICTY and encouraged cooperation 
with neighbouring countries to enhance reconciliation and social cohesion. Further action is 
needed to increase Roma representation in political life, public administration, and the judiciary, 
as well as to better education, employment, and housing (ibid.).    
Regarding refugee return, housing repossession, and reconstruction were satisfactory, yet there 
was a need for further significant efforts from Croatia, particularly in regards to implementing 
housing care programs for former tenancy rights holders and creating the economic and social 
conditions necessary for sustainable refugee return. In particular, the Serb minority remained an 
urgent priority to resolve its internal displacement. The implementation of the Constitutional Law 
on National Minorities was slow, as Serb minority was regarded as fellows of aggressors, and 
faced a lot of discrimination, from the return to their soils to a lack of job opportunities and real 
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estate options, and eventually integration into society (Kajtazović, 2017, p. 71). The laws and 
norms were present, but their implementation was not successful. It depended on political will of 
the local communities and other actors. In this phase, the EU used an enlargement policy 
instrument - the pressure, which resolved the displacement issue. Even though the Serb minority 
is included in society, the war narrative is still present today, and they are regarded as war 
aggressors, not as a part of society, with no intercultural understanding (Kajtazović, 2017, p. 72). 
Difficulties were also found in the field of the judiciary, as the comprehensive strategy and 
implementation for judicial reform was required. The primary problem was anti-corruption. A 
legal framework for tackling corruption was established, however, these efforts need to be 
followed up with real implementation, including improved coordination of the government bodies 
and agencies involved (European Commission, 2005).  
Thus, the accession to the EU was not the end phase, as Article 36 of the Act of Accession required 
the Commission to provide six-monthly progress assessments on Croatia’s efforts to implement 
the remaining accession negotiations, as on competition policy, judiciary and fundamental rights, 
and freedom, security, and justice (European Commission, 2012, p. 4). That meant very strict 
monitoring by many actors, including the European Commission, the EU Delegation to Croatia, 
as well as the Member States and other international organizations (Vlasić Feketija and Lasowski, 
2014, p. 14). 
Compliance with the political criteria was described under Comprehensive Monitoring Report on 
Croatia’s state of preparedness for EU membership (European Commission, 2012). It examined 
compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria, and regional cooperation, good neighbourly 
relations, and compliance with international obligations (as cooperation with the ICTY). Issues 
relating to the judiciary, corruption, and human rights (including the issue of minority protection) 
are dealt with in more detail under Chapter 23, which also addresses cooperation with the ICTY 
and war crimes (European Commission, 2012, p. 5).  
Five of Croatia’s eight additional conditions derived from the EC’s initial assessment and further 
interpretation of Croatia’s accession progress, and three came from the country’s neighbouring EU 
member states, Slovenia and Italy (ibid.). Nevertheless, the Report criticized the anti-corruption 
policy, and even though human rights were respected, with the Ombudsman office assuring 
 54  
 
protection of those, there was no proper follow-up of the Ombudsman’s recommendation. The 
LGBT people face discrimination and conditions for sustainable refugee return needed to be 
further developed. And the larger critique was (European Commission, 2012, p. 7):  
Protection of minorities has continued to improve, through the continued implementation of 
measures including the Constitutional Act on the Rights of National Minorities. However, the 
minority employment in the state administration and judiciary remains below the level required by 
the act. In line with the Constitution, eight representatives of national minorities were elected in 
the parliamentary elections of December 2011. Croatia needs to foster a spirit of tolerance towards 
minorities, in particular, Croatian Serbs and to take measures to protect those who may still be 
subjected to threats or acts of discrimination, hostility or violence. The Roma minority faces 
particularly difficult living conditions, and challenges remain in the areas of education, social 
protection, health care, employment, and access to personal documents. 
However, even though the relations with minorities need to be further improved, it is 
unquestionable that the EU integration process has played a pivotal role in the realization of the 
minority rights in Croatia, and the government assures funding for the realization of various 
minority association and institutions (Petrušić, 2008, p. 15). Thus, the EU managed with the use 
of instruments as the SAP (with the focus on regional cooperation), negotiations, international 
pressure, and economic tools to guide Croatia to the finish line of accession negotiations, and as 
such Croatia represents a successful story, with integration approach that was beneficial to Croatia 
itself, and the region of the WB.  
5.3 Bosnia and Herzegovina   
After 20 years of BiH-EU relations, it seems that BiH cannot overcome the political obstructions 
and cannot reaffirm reforms the EU demanded. As the stabilization approach was focused on the 
SAP (resolution of instability and the general stabilization and development of the region), and 
then on enlargement, BiH needed first to focus on improvements and reform within the state itself. 
The EU was and is still aware of the difficulties of the BiH system and has launched various 
initiatives to enhance constitutional reforms, which all ended unsuccessfully each time. Hence, the 
accession negotiation with BiH introduced a new enlargement policy instrument: initiative. The 
most famous and “successful” was the so-called “April Package” initiated in 2006, resulting in a 
package of constitutional reforms that were accepted at that time by most of the ruling parties, but 
then failed to be adopted in the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH by only two votes. What followed 
was the so-called Butmir Process in 2008/2009; another attempt which tried to save some elements 
from the bigger April Package that also failed (Grünther-Đečević, 2017).   
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In 2014, Great Britain and Germany initiated, and the EU launched a new initiative called the “EU 
initiative”, promising real progress toward the EU accession. The main focus was to move away 
from political reforms to socio-economic and related reforms at all levels of government with 
installed Reform Agenda. Besides, the Reform Agenda is linked with the aims of the EU’s new 
approach to economic governance in the WB and conforms with the Economic Reform Programme 
as a fundamental element to encourage comprehensive structural reforms to maintain 
macroeconomic stability and to boost growth and competitiveness (Grünther-Đečević, 2017). 
Despite the Reform Agenda, the country is trapped in its highly institutionalized corruption, high 
unemployment, and ethnic tensions, even though, the Head of the EU Delegation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and EUSR, Ambassador Lars-Gunnar Wigemark, said that the EU’s 2015 progress 
report for BiH was “probably the best ever”, which was published in BiH daily newspaper Dnevni 
Avaz (ibid.).  
Up to 2017, the EU has been trying to manage BiH’s deep political and structural problems through 
the technical tools of the EU accession process. At the end of May 2017, a new initiative for the 
Balkans, the “Berlin Plus Process” was presented by the German Foreign Ministry. This initiative 
has additional efforts and funding for an infrastructure and technology fund. It includes the 
establishment of a special fund for start-ups, professional training, and the development of IT 
infrastructure (Marciacq, 2017, p. 10). 
However, the deadlock situations that came with the failure of constitutional reform issue and 
police reform issue was hard to surpass. The EU wanted another approach, and from the 2014 
Initiative, all matters were put on hold until progress in socio-economic areas was made. The 2014 
Initiative seems to put BiH back on track and involved the UK-Germany Initiative. By focusing 
on social-economic issues the EU has been trying to achieve progress in less controversial areas. 
Still, the Progress Report of 2014 was mostly negative and the conclusion was (European 
Commission, 2014):  
The country remains at a standstill in the European integration process. There remains a lack of 
collective political will on the part of the political leaders to address the reforms necessary for 
progress on the EU path. There has been very limited progress on political and economic issues 
and on moving towards European standards. 
As BiH surely did not recognize political and social benefits from the EU membership, another 
instrument was used – financial assistance - IPA. IPA became an instrument by which the EU 
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supports reforms in the enlargement process with financial and technical help. In that way, the EU 
is the largest provider of financial assistance to BiH (OECD, 2019, p. 533). In the year 2013, EC’s 
annual Progress Report concluded that further discussion on the IPA II would be postponed until 
the country is back on track in the EU integration process (Sigma, 2014, p. 2), thus, showing that 
the first IPA did not present desirable results. However, bilateral IPA II Indicative funding 
allocations in the period 2014–2020 amount to €552.1 million (including funds for the Civil 
Society Facility (€9.1 million), Regional Housing Programme (€10 million) and special measures 
following 2014 floods (€51 million)) (European Commission, 2020). IPA support in BiH is 
conditional upon it adopting key state-wide strategies (i.e., for the whole economy, including all 
the entities). The sector strategies for the environment, adopted in May 2017, and for rural 
development, adopted in February 2018, enabled IPA financing in those sectors. To fully benefit 
from IPA II funding for 2018–20, BiH will need to adopt state-wide strategies for public financial 
management and employment (Delegation of the EU to BiH, 2018).  
Surely, the IPA funds were an additional boost, as BiH managed to submit its EU membership 
application in 2016, the EC switched to the Questionnaire to BiH. Three years after, in the year 
2019, BiH submitted the official application for EU membership. It was essential and conditional 
to stick to the time framework that was envisaged, which was six months, yet those six months 
became a year. In February 2018, the Questionnaire was completed and handed over to the EU 
officials. Afterwards, additional 665 questions were sent from Brussels. In the end, answers were 
submitted in 2019, after being confirmed by all levels of authorities in BiH (Dragojlović, 2019). 
Most answers were about the chapters related to political criteria 106, social policy and 
employment 43, transport policy 38, justice, freedom and security 36, and economic criteria 33 
(ibid.). Yet, the constitutional architecture remains insufficient and in breach of the European 
Convention on Human rights, public administration remains highly politicised and service delivery 
is still poor, and BiH is still facing many challenges regarding human rights and the protection of 
minorities (European Commission, 2015, p. 4). 
For the help in creating a functioning institution, the CoE made the first Action Plan (2015–2017) 
(Council of Europe, 2018, p. 6) which was backed by the EU to assist the country to comply with 
CoE standards and EU acquis in the framework of the enlargement process most notably in the 
areas of justice, anti-discrimination, education, social inclusion, freedom of expression and 
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cybercrime. Similarly, voluntary contributions of CoE member States allowed the implementation 
of projects to reinforce the capacity of the judiciary, to support penitentiary reforms, to promote 
freedom of media, to strengthen human rights protection, to provide pre-electoral assistance, and 
to empower young people to take a more active role in political processes (Council of Europe, 
2018, p. 6). BiH achieved progress with regards to the harmonisation of the judicial practice, 
paving the way for a more consistent application of the legislation and possible legislative reforms. 
The functioning of penitentiary institutions across BiH prison jurisdictions was further aligned 
with international standards, laying the foundation for achieving sustainability of reforms and local 
ownership over the capacity building process. The enhanced co-operation between the 
Ombudsman and civil society proved to be a good tool to boost the implementation of the 
Ombudsmen’s recommendations in the fight against discrimination. The improved 
professionalism of the electoral administration and development of the curriculum of the new 
Education Centre of the Central Electoral Commission was a positive step in the broader reform 
of the electoral system (Council of Europe, 2018, p. 3). 
The CoE issued the second Action plan (2018–2021). Its goal was to support the reforms bringing 
the legislation, institutions, and practice in BiH further in line with European standards in the areas 
of human rights, the rule of law, and democracy, and therefore support its efforts in meeting its 
obligations as a CoE member State. It also aims to support the European integration process. The 
Action Plan covers all three pillars of co-operation, providing expert and technical assistance in 
the effective implementation of the CoE standards in priority areas and in enhancing the capacity 
of relevant institutions to function effectively. This includes measures for excelling co-ordinated 
actions between stakeholders, which are a prerequisite for addressing complex governance 
challenges and for empowering beneficiaries to engage in a dialogue with civil society. The main 
focus of the co-operation will be the fight against discrimination and economic crime as well as 
the promotion of the freedom of expression (Council of Europe, 2018, p. 11). Thus, the EU path 
for BiH continues, with the help of the CoE to bring legislation and practice closer to European 
standards, promoting human rights, strengthen the rule of law, and ensure democratic governance.  
Public administration reform needs to be implemented; judicial independence and the fight against 
corruption and organized crime strengthened, the adequate legal framework for the local elections 
(as the case was with the city of Mostar that finally elect the first municipal council since 2008). 
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There are no countrywide strategies on human rights and anti-discrimination, protection, and 
inclusion of vulnerable groups. Inclusive and quality education for all is also necessary to 
overcome the practice of “two schools under one roof” and to implement the related court rulings 
(European Commission, 2019, p. 9). In the end, BiH did not fulfil the Copenhagen criteria, nor the 
mentioned additional requirements. Even though BiH is active in regional cooperation and 
maintains good neighbourly relations, it still has a strict visa regime with Kosovo.  
As the EC concluded: “While a decentralized state structure is compatible with EU membership, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina will need to reform its institutions to be able to effectively participate in 
EU decision-making and to fully implement and enforce the acquis” (European Commission, 
2019, p. 13). Thus, the decentralized state structure is not problematic to the EU, yet it is not 
functioning and their institutions are not able to take over the EU obligations, and as such cannot 

















The predominant group of states that are currently part of the EU integration procedures is the 
post-conflict states of the WB. Two decades ago, it was regarded that the WB would become a 
part of the EU by now. However, the WB is a post-conflict region still in transition. Countries of 
the region did not overcome the difficulties of transition and the EU made the integration 
procedures stricter, placing the rule of the law at the heart of the EU’s accession process since 
2011. The EU pursued a “general enlargement policy” approach, which was not in touch with the 
reality of what was going on in the WB. Thus, this thesis researched the enlargement policy 
formulated with specific attention to their post-conflict situations. Post-conflict states are observed 
in a transition continuum rather than placed in boxes of being hostile or living in peace. 
Additionally, this research aimed to discover whether and what lessons the EU, particularly the 
EC, has learned via its relations with post-conflict states. The aim was to provide evidence that the 
EU can no longer use a general enlargement policy (“business as usual”) approach and can further 
illustrate how separate enlargement strategies were and/or need to be prepared. The concept of 
conditionality was formulated as the core of research, observing the political criteria and political 
conditionality in the EU accession processes. This thesis used a case study comparison, namely 
the Republic of Cyprus, and two states from the WB -Croatia and BiH. By reflecting the way BiH 
responded and adopted to the EU’s pressure, the EU can “rethink” its concept of enlargement. 
Therefore, the research question I pursued was how does the EU’s use of political conditionality 
to post-conflict states in the accession process of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s accession differ from 
that of Cyprus and Croatia? 
The EU as a global actor uses the concept of actorness and has the opportunity and willingness to 
act. When the EU is presented with an opportunity, a decision maker’s willingness is to choose a 
course of action. Thus, the willingness of the EU is an independent variable, as the question is how 
decision-makers choose by defining post-conflict states as such. The dependent variable is the 
EU’s capability aspect of actorness that was measured in the cases of post-conflict states. The 
enlargement process was studied as a tool for conflict resolution, whereby the EU’s capability is 
the internal EU context which determines the ability to formulate effective policies and the 
availability of appropriate policy instruments. In the conceptual part, I established that the EU was 
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choosing between a stabilisation or integration approach. In the stabilisation approach, the aim of 
stability takes priority over integration and overlaps with the perspective for membership in the 
EU. Contrary, the integration approach favours achieving membership by meeting the formal 
accession criteria via conditionality.  
In the empirical part, enlargement policy values were examined, as well the domestic, regional, 
and global actors that were involved in the particular case of a post-conflict state, and the historical 
overview was made. The main role of the EU in the Cyprus conflict was to try and reach an 
agreement on the conflict settlement, but since the EU was unsuccessful, only the Greek Cypriot 
part of the island entered the EU as a Member State. After six years of negotiation, Croatia entered 
the EU, as with multilateral post-conflict reconciliation and regional cooperation to all national 
minorities (particularly the Serb minority) were guaranteed the respect of their civic, political, 
cultural, religious, and linguistic rights. BiH holds potential membership status in the EU, and the 
role of the EU’s presence in BiH was related to post-conflict intervention, endorsing the 
institutional-building process.  
Secondly, research explored the EU formulation of enlargement policy goals in order to investigate 
whether post-conflict states were defined as such in the initial assessment of the state. As the EU 
and Cyprus relation started, it was regarded that the solution for the Cyprus problem and the 
accession to the EU would be inter-related, however, the accession to the EU became one thing, 
and the solution of the Cyprus problem a parallel, but completely different process. Cyprus as such 
was not defined as a post-conflict state, as the term used was the “Cyprus problem”. Being defined 
as the Cyprus problem, the unification of the island did not constitute a precondition for accession 
and accession negotiation with Cyprus started before a political settlement was reached. Therefore, 
the EU did not base its enlargement policy instruments in that regard, and Brussels still is not a 
participant in the settlement of the Cyprus problem. The integration approach preceded over 
stabilization approach, thus the Cyprus enlargement process was not a tool for conflict resolution, 
as the unification did not become conditional upon the enlargement process.  
In comparison to Cyprus, Croatia was de facto regarded as a post-conflict state, and additionally, 
the EU demanded domestic transformation, which was conditional, using the stabilization 
approach to create security and stability in the state, and development of the region using the SAP 
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for the conflict resolution. Both states, Cyprus and Croatia, in their assessments of a state, were 
assessed as capable to cope with EU membership. In the Cyprus case, the EU aimed to upgrade 
the political and economic governance and did not have a direct impact on their formal sovereignty. 
Yet, in the case of Croatia, the accession negotiations focus was on Chapter 23, protection of 
minorities, and regional cooperation that had a direct impact on Croatian sovereignty. With 
additional requirements and the creation of the SAP, the enlargement to the WB was regarded by 
the EU as a tool for conflict resolution and the stabilisation approach was selected. It was regarded 
that the transition to the EU had to move in parallel with efforts to restore pace and political-social 
stability. The goal of the SAP is the conclusion of an SAA, which binds the EU and the WB in a 
formal association.  
Similar to Croatia, BiH was also defined as a post-conflict state in the EU’s initial assessment. 
Unlike Croatia, BiH was directly categorized as the one who suffers from the conflict, and that the 
latter presented an obstacle to moving forward in the path to the EU. BiH did not pass the phase 
of a heavier reconstruction and neither did it pass an additional phase of political and economic 
consolidation (as institution-building and economic reform). Additionally, it carries the burden of 
the country’s complicated system. Thus, the EU made focus on the reconstruction of BiH, 
demanding constitutional reform, especially the implementation of the Sejdić and Finci verdict 
and BiH police reform, which were not successful. All initiatives started with the pressure of the 
EU and the OHR and unlike in Croatia’s case, did not come as an initiative of national political 
parties. It created a similar situation with Cyprus, as the Cyprus issue and BiH constitutional 
reform were regarded as a daunting and overarching task, and were automatically not regarded as 
an imperative for membership. However, in the case of BiH, the principle of conditionality was 
stricter (without police reform, there was no SAA). Without overcoming this situation, BiH was 
far away from the stabilization approach that was aimed to be used in the case of BiH to work with 
SAP and the development of the region. EU conditionality, thus, proved insufficient to entice 
domestic actors into action.  
Yet, as the aim of this research was to see what lessons the EU has learned through its use of 
conditionality in post-conflict states and whether policy goals have been altered according to 
policy results, a second conclusion must be drawn. The data show that EU policy goals did not 
alter according to policy results. They did not alter accordingly, as Cyprus was not regarded as a 
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post-conflict state, and the solution to the Cyprus problem was separated from accession 
negotiation. This brings us to the conclusion, that if a potential member state is defined as a post-
conflict state, the EU would use a stabilisation approach prior to the integration. The stabilisation 
approach with the prospect of EU membership worked as a mechanism to initiate and sustain 
reforms, which was important to create a strong framework for conflict resolution and regional 
cooperation.  
Third, the research focused on enlargement policy instruments (diplomacy/negotiations and 
economic tools). In the case of Cyprus, when the EU divided accession negotiations from the 
unification, and when the unification did not follow the member-state status, the EU used the 
instrument of diplomacy. With the problems of legality and politics, the Cyprus problem creates 
inherent contradictions for the EU project. The EU could not require at that time a unified Cyprus, 
as the interaction between Greek Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot, and Turkish interests on the one hand 
and EU policies of conditionality on the other were regarded to produce some kind of a crisis rather 
than settlement. Yet, the EU put pressure on Turkey, as Turkey had a long-standing ambition of 
accession to the EU. Ankara, however, did not change its mind and did not agree to negotiate 
Cyprus settlement along federal lines. Greece as a member state also did not ensure the solution to 
the Cyprus dispute, which strengthened the centrifugal tendencies in Cyprus. It is important to 
emphasize, Cyprus proves that was capable of fulfilling its duties as a Member State during the 
accession negotiations, and even as it is a “frozen conflict” still, it does not have any casualties. It 
was not an adequate assessment to assume the Cyprus issue can be solved by pushing Ankara to 
change its mind and adopt a more compromising stance on Cyprus for the benefits of accession. 
The EU used a variety of diplomatic and political instruments on both sides, as well on Turkey, 
yet the EU did not insist on the stabilisation approach and had the burden of the geopolitics on 
their side. This reaffirms that EU membership can be an important and powerful tool in initiating 
reforms, yet not a tool to resolve conflicts through the enlargement process.  
In the case of Croatia, the EU imposed pressure, very strict monitoring, which was a step further 
from negotiation and diplomacy. Thus, the instruments used were: diplomacy/negotiation, 
economic tools, and multilateral international pressure (especially necessary cooperation with the 
ICTY), and the CoE reports recommendations. Those instruments combined with the stabilization 
approach, and very strict conditionality in Chapter 23, particularly regarding the integration of 
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Serb minority, the EU with SAP used diplomatic and economic instruments and produced 
resolution of instability and final accession to the EU. Even the relations with minorities need to 
be further improved, it is unquestionable that the EU integration process has played a pivotal role 
in the realization of the minority rights in Croatia, and the government assures funding for the 
realization of various minority association and institution. Thus, with the integration of the Serb 
minority, regional cooperation, and full cooperation with the ICTY, the EU regarded Croatia as 
one that moved from the post-war traumas, and as such, Croatia represents a success story. The 
SAP, as the core of the stabilisation approach, used exhaustive support and assistance through 
technical guidance to initiate reforms, and with integration, the goal of enlargement was met.  
As Croatia successfully overpassed all tasks of domestic reform, the BiH did not undergo a 
demanded reform within the state itself. The EU was and still is aware of the difficulties of the 
BiH system and so, it launched various initiatives to enhance constitutional reforms, which all 
ended unsuccessfully. Hence, the accession negotiation with BiH introduced a new enlargement 
policy instrument: initiative. These were state- and international institutions-lead. The EU was 
present with many initiatives that faced deadlock. As the reforms were not productive, the 2014 
Initiative (or UK-Germany Initiative) wanted to improve socio-economic areas and use economic 
tools for improvements. Yet, combined with the financial assistance of the IPA funds, the results 
of improvement are not visible. Additionally, the CoE with two Action Plans was included to 
implement the project to reinforce the capacity and create BiH as a functioning EU member state. 
Again, this proved to be an unsuccessful initiative. Even if BiH is responsible for all the deadlock 
situations, the cases of BiH and Cyprus questioned the power of EU conditionality. This can be a 
lesson that the EU did not learn, as still it is regarded that conditionality puts pressure on domestic 
officials to implement all EU related agenda and enhance improvements and desirable changes.  
In the end, I expected to confirm the following thesis: The EU changed the use of conditionality 
in the formulation of the political criteria for the post-conflict state of the 2004 enlargement round 
with the Republic of Cyprus in comparison to the accession processes of the WB states, namely, 
the Republic of Croatia and BiH. The thesis can be confirmed, as the established changes in the 
EU’s approach were the following: Cyprus was not defined as a post-conflict state. In that regard, 
the enlargement policy did not include a stabilisation approach the accession process was not 
conditioned by conflict resolution. Croatia and BiH were regarded as post-conflict states. By 
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combining the integration and stabilisation approach, additional conditions were outlined, which 
Croatia successfully met, yet BiH did not.  
In efforts to produce stability and prosperity, the EU wanted to be involved in the WB and to 
produce changes, thus, additional conditions were required. The WB enlargement encompasses a 
dynamic and innovative enlargement policy to contribute to security, stability, and prosperity in 
Europe as a whole. The data presented in the analysis point to a conclusion that the problem is the 
EU willingness. For future BiH relations with the EU, the Cyprus model is not a viable solution. 
The findings of this thesis show that for conditionality to succeed in BiH, a more tailored approach 
is needed, one conducive to a post-conflict state, still in the reform process of its state-building. 
The situation in BiH still challenges the external demands that are placed on the domestic policies, 
which is questioning the adequacy of those reforms sought by the EU that touch on the core 
characteristics of the internal structure of BiH state as those demands suffered from a lack of 
clarity. Additionally, all changes in the conditionality influence the willingness of countries to 
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7 Povzetek v slovenskem jeziku – The summary in Slovenian  
 
Večina držav, ki so kandidatke za članstvo v Evropski uniji (EU), so pokonfliktne države z 
območja Zahodnega Balkana. Zahodni Balkan je tranzicijsko območje z obetom vstopa v EU; je 
območje zaznamovano z gospodarskimi spori, etničnimi napetostmi in visoko stopnjo nezaupanja 
do političnega vodstva. To magistrsko delo raziskuje oblikovanje zunanje politike EU, ki je 
najbolj izrazito izražena v njeni širitveni politiki do izbranih držav, s posebnim poudarkom na 
njihovih pokonfliktnih razmerah. Prvi cilj te naloge je analizirati, kako EU v svoji širitveni 
politiki oblikuje politične cilje v zvezi s pokonfliktnimi državami, zlasti kako EU uporablja 
strategijo pogojevanja. Drugi cilj naloge je ugotoviti, česa se je EU naučila z uporabo pogojevanja 
v pokonfliktnih državah ter ali so se politični cilji spremenili glede na rezultate. Naloga temelji 
na primerjavi treh študijskih primerov pokonfliktnih držav in njihovih pogajanj za pristop k EU, 
in sicer Republike Ciper ter dveh držav z Zahodnega Balkana: Hrvaške ter Bosne in Hercegovine 
(BiH). Raziskava je osredotočena na vprašanje, ali so Ciper, Hrvaška in BiH v širitveni politiki 
EU opredeljene kot pokonfliktne, kako se je politično pogojevanje med temi državami 
razlikovalo od drugih in kako je EU prenašala izkušnje iz pristopnega procesa Cipra na države 
Zahodnega Balkana. Raziskovalno vprašanje se zato glasi: Kako se uporaba političnega 
pogojevanja pri pokonfliktnih državah razlikuje v primeru BiH na eni strani ter Cipra in Hrvaške 
na drugi strani? 
Magistrsko delo je razdeljeno na pet delov: v drugem poglavju je EU v konstruktivističnem 
pogledu opredeljena kot globalni akter z zmogljivostjo in s pripravljenostjo za delovanje. Ko se 
odločevalcu ponudi priložnost odločanja, njegova odločitev hkrati odraža njegove cilje in 
motivacijo. Neodvisna spremenljivka je pripravljenost EU (potek ukrepanja), in sicer v smislu, 
katere izbire in omejitve ima na voljo. Kadar je država opredeljena kot pokonfliktna, EU izbira 
med stabilizacijskim in integracijskim pristopom. Zato je odvisna spremenljivka v raziskavi 
zmogljivost EU (pristopni cilji in instrumenti); gre za notranji kontekst EU in njeno sposobnost 
oblikovanja učinkovitih politik ter razpoložljivosti ustreznih instrumentov za izvedbo ciljev. 
Tretje poglavje predstavlja zgodovinski pregled odnosov izbranih pokonfliktnih držav z EU. 
Tako Ciper kot Hrvaška sta članici EU, vendar je le grško-ciprski del otoka vstopil v EU kot 
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država članica. Od decembra 2016 ima BiH status potencialnega članstva v EU in je s svojim 
zelo zapletenim  političnim sistemom imela težave z začetnim odzivom na politične reforme, ki 
jih je določila EU. 
V četrtem poglavju se raziskava osredotoča na začetno oceno Evropske komisije do pristopnih 
držav. Ciper kot tak ni bil nikoli opredeljen kot pokonfliktna država, saj se je njegov konfliktu  
opisovalo kot "ciprski problem" ali "ciprsko vprašanje". Zato je imel prednost integracijski 
pristop pred stabilizacijskim, saj rešitev ciprskega problema ni bila predpogoj za pristop k EU. 
Nasprotno pa sta Hrvaška in BiH v začetni oceni EU bili opredeljeni kot pokonfliktni državi, od 
katerih se je kot pogoj zahtevalo oz. se zahteva domača preobrazba; to pomeni, da je pred 
integracijskim prevladal stabilizacijski pristop za ustvarjanje varnosti in stabilnosti v državi z 
uporabo Stabilizacijsko pridružitvenega procesa (SAP) ter za stabilnost in razvoj regije 
Zahodnega Balkana z regionalnim sodelovanjem za reševanje odprtih pokonfliktnih vprašanj.  
V petem poglavju naloge je izvedena analizira zmogljivosti EU glede uporabe političnih 
instrumentov, kot so diplomacija/pogajanja in ekonomska orodja. V primeru Cipra je EU 
uporabila različne diplomatske in politične instrumente za upravljanje odnosov med ciprskimi 
Grki, ciprskimi Turki in interesi Republike Turčije. V primeru Hrvaške je EU z uporabo 
instrumentov, kot so SAP, pogajanja, priporočila Sveta Evrope, mednarodni pritisk in ekonomska 
orodja, vodila Hrvaško do uspešnega zaključka pristopnih pogajanj. Odnosi med BiH in EU pa 
temeljijo na sprožanju pobud. Ker se mora BiH osredotočiti na izboljšave in reforme znotraj same 
države, so nastali tako imenovani "aprilski sveženj" (sveženj ustavnih reform), v letih 2008/2009 
butmirski proces, leta 2014 "pobuda EU" (Velika Britanija in Nemčija sta začeli družbeno-
ekonomsko reformo z reformsko agendo), leta 2017 “proces Berlin plus“ (posebni sklad za 
novoustanovljena podjetja, strokovno usposabljanje in razvoj informacijske infrastrukture), 
kasneje pa še dva akcijska načrta Sveta Evrope in predpristopna finančna pomoč IPA ter IPA II. 
Magistrska naloga tako pokaže, da je EU spremenila uporabo pogojevanja pri oblikovanju 
političnih meril za pokonfliktne države od širitve leta 2004 (Ciper) do pristopnih pogajanj z 
zahodnobalkanskima državama (Hrvaško in BiH). Ciper ni bil opredeljen kot pokonfliktna 
država, zato širitvena politika ni vključevala stabilizacijskega pristopa, posledično tudi reševanje 
konflikta ni bilo pogojeno v pristopnem procesu. Hrvaška in BiH pa sta bili obravnavani kot 
pokonfliktni državi, ki so jima bili postavljeni dodatni pogoji v kombinaciji integracijskega in 
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stabilizacijskega pristopa, ki jih je Hrvaška uspešno izpolnila, BiH pa (še) ne. Stabilizacijski 
pristop z možnostjo članstva v EU je deloval kot mehanizem za začetek in vzdrževanje reform, 
kar je bilo pomembno pri oblikovanju močnega okvirja za reševanje konfliktov in vzpostavljanja 
regionalnega sodelovanja. Vendar pa se EU ni naučila, da s pogojevanjem ne more pritiskati in 
na silo doseči, da domači uradniki izvajajo vse programe, povezane z EU, in s tem dosežejo 
predvidene izboljšave in spremembe. To ponovno potrjuje, da je članstvo v EU lahko pomembno 
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